## 1nc

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#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

**Army Officer School 2005**

(“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

**Ericson, California Polytechnic dean emeritus, 2003**

(Jon, The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, pg 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Vote NEG:

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### 2. Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

**Steinberg and Freeley, Miami communication studies lecturer and Boston based attorney, 2008**

(David and Austin, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, pg 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### 3. Maintaining even division of ground and contestability is key to maintain debate’s unique potential for educational dialogue-alternative interpretations-guarantee uneducational monologues.

**Hanghoj, Aarhus education assistant professor, 2008**

(Thorkild, “Playful Knowledge An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”, <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

**Morson, Northwestern professor, 2004**

(Gary, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning (Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives), pg 330-2)

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

### 2

#### EX POST COUNTERPLAN

#### We advocate ex post judicial review as strategic resistance to the regime of targeted killing.

#### CP restricts TKS

Corey, Army Colonel, 12 (Colonel Ian G. Corey, “Citizens in the Crosshairs: Ready, Aim, Hold Your Fire?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561582)

Alternatively, targeted killing decisions could be subjected to judicial review. 103 Attorney General Holder rejected ex ante judicial review out of hand, citing the Constitution’s allocation of national security operations to the executive branch and the need for timely action.104 Courts are indeed reluctant to stray into the realm of political questions, as evidenced by the district court’s dismissal of the ACLU and CCR lawsuit. On the other hand, a model for a special court that operates in secret already exists: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that oversees requests for surveillance warrants for suspected foreign agents. While ex ante judicial review would provide the most robust form of oversight, ex post review by a court like the FISC would nonetheless serve as a significant check on executive power.105 Regardless of the type of oversight implemented, some form of independent review is necessary to demonstrate accountability and bolster confidence in the targeted killing process. Conclusion The United States has increasingly relied on targeted killing as an important tactic in its war on terror and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.106 This is entirely reasonable given current budgetary constraints and the appeal of targeted killing, especially UAS strikes, as an alternative to the use of conventional forces. Moreover, the United States will likely again seek to employ the tactic against U.S. citizens assessed to be operational leaders of AQAM. As demonstrated above, one can make a good faith argument that doing so is entirely permissible under both international and domestic law as the Obama Administration claims, the opinions of some prominent legal scholars notwithstanding. The viability of future lethal targeting of U.S. citizens is questionable, however, if the government fails to address legitimate issues of transparency and accountability. While the administration has recently made progress on the transparency front, much more remains to be done, including the release in some form of the legal analysis contained in OLC’s 2010 opinion. Moreover, the administration must be able to articulate to the American people how it selects U.S. citizens for targeted killing and the safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of error and abuse. Finally, these targeting decisions must be subject to some form of independent review that will both satisfy due process and boost public confidence.

#### Debating the intricacies of the topic is key reverse excessive presidential authority-impact is constant and unlimited military actions

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

### 3

#### PRESUMPTION DA

#### Presumption---voting affirmative is a response to the states disciplinary techniques---subjectivization participates in oppressive power structures---voting negative on presumption is more valuable

**Snoek, Macquarie philosophy PhD, 2012**

(Anke, Agamben's Joyful Kafka: Finding Freedom Beyond Subordination, google books, ldg)

Given the preceding sketch Agamben gives of power and possibilities (the law’s being in force without significance, the subtle reverse found in Kafka’s work of this situation, Agamben’s praise of creatures without work), the questions arise: what ought we to do now? What form of resistance is possible for us? How should we act? What can we do? This is actually one of the major criticisms on Agamben’s work, that in it, at least when read superficially, Agamben nowhere seems to formulate any explicit answer to the question of resistance. The Italian political philosopher Antonio Negri, also one of Agamben’s close friends, points out that Agamben was never directly involved in political struggles and he sees this as a great lack in his philosophy. 2 Agamben’s work is often described as a radical passivity. 3 This passivity can be seen both as a strength and a weakness of his work. Agamben’s passivity is not a regular powerlessness, but seems to come close to (Mahayana) Buddhism, an exercise in doing nothing. 4 This passivity also shows evidence of a radical paradigm shift in thinking about power and resistance, a movement that is often attributed to Foucault and whose traces can be found in Kafka avant la lettre. As is evident from the above, Agamben is fundamentally opposed to the tendency of metaphysical politics to attribute an identity to the human being, to allocate to him a work of his own. If the human being has no identity of his own and no activity of his own, then this also has consequences for our traditional view of actions as being fundamentally embedded within end-means relationships, as goal-oriented in essence. Our views of activities and activism must therefore be thoroughly revised in line with our revision of the possibility of a transcendent work of man. Kafka’s opera singing executioners or questioners Deleuze once defined power as the act in which the human being is cut off from its potentiality. But, Agamben states, ‘There is, nevertheless, another and more insidious operation of power that does not immediately affect what humans can do – their potentiality – but rather their “impotentiality”, that is, what they cannot do, or better, can *not do*’ (N, 43). Given that flexibility is the primary quality the market requires from us, the contemporary human, yielding to every demand by society, is cut off from his impotentiality, from his ability to do nothing. Just as we saw previously, politics is a politics of the act, of the human individual being at work. The irresponsible motto of the contemporary individual, ‘No problem, I can do it’, comes precisely at the moment ‘when he should instead realize that he has been consigned in unheard of measure to forces and processes over which he has lost all control’ (N, 44). This flexibility also leads to a confusion of professions and callings, of professional identities and social roles, because people are no longer in touch with their inability. Agamben sees an example of this in Kafka’s *The Trial*. In the last chapter, just before his death, two men enter through Joseph K.’ s door. They are his questioners/ executioners, but Joseph K. does not recognize them as such and thinks that they are ‘[o]ld second-rate actors or opera singers?’ 5 Agamben argues that, in Kafka’s world, evil is presented as an inadequate reaction to impotentiality (CC, 31). Instead of making use of our possibility of ‘not being’, we fail it, we flee from our lack of power, ‘our fearful retreat from it in order to exercise … some power of being’ (CC, 32). But this power we try to exercise turns into a malevolent power that oppresses the persons who show us their weakness. In Kafka’s world, evil does not have the form of the demonic but that of being separated from our lack of power. Nothing makes us more impoverished and less free than this estrangement from impotentiality. Those who are separated from what they can do, can, however, still resist; they can still not do. Those who are separated from their own impotentiality lose, on the other hand, first of all the capacity to resist. (N, 45) And it is evident, according to Agamben, from the example of Eichmann how right Kafka was in this (CC, 32). Eichmann was not so much separated from his power as from his lack of power, tempted to evil precisely by the powers of right and law (CC, 32). What should one do? A clash with activists At the end of 2009, Agamben gave a lecture in honour of the presentation of a collection of texts written by the Tiqqun collective. This French collective has written several political manifestoes and in 2008 their compound was raided by the anti-terrorist brigades. The charges were quite vague: belonging to an ultra-left and the anarcho-autonomous milieu; using a radical discourse; having links with foreign groups; participating regularly in political demonstrations. The evidence that was found was not weapons, but documents, for example a train schedule. Although Agamben calls these charges a tragicomedy and accuses French politics of barbarism6, in his lecture he emphasizes another important political value of the Tiqqun collective. This collective embodies Foucault’s idea of the non-subject. One of the latter’s greatest merits is that he thought of power no longer as an attribute that a certain group had over another, but as a relation that was constantly shifting. A second merit of Foucault’s thinking was the idea of non-authorship. The subject itself, its identity, is always formed within a power relation, a process that Foucault termed ‘subjectivization techniques’. In Foucault, the state attempts to form the subject via disciplinary techniques and the subject responds via subjectivization techniques: it internalizes the expectations of the state in the formation of its own identity. That is why Foucault rejects the idea of a subject and the idea of actorship, of attributing an act to a subject. Hence, as long as we continue to think in terms of a subject resisting oppressive power via deliberate action, we cannot liberate ourselves from power relations. The gesture Tiqqun instead is making , according to Agamben, not one of looking for a subject that can assume the role of saviour or revolutionary. Rather, they begin with investigating the force fields that are operative in our society (instead of focusing on the subject). In describing these fields of force and the moment they become diffuse, new possibilities can arise that are not dependent on a subject. The discussion that followed this lecture provides a very clear picture of Agamben’s position. Many activists present at the lecture asked what his theory entailed concretely with respect to the direction in which they should go. Agamben’s constant reply was that anyone who poses this question has not understood the problem at all.I always find it out of place to go and ask someone what to do, what is there to be done? … If someone asks me what action, it shows they missed the point because they still want me to say: go out in the streets and do this? It has nothing to do with that. (OT) Inactivity as active resistance to the state was hardly conceivable for many of the left wing activists present at Agamben’s lecture at Tiqqun. Although the state acknowledges the anti-law tendencies in the writings of the Tiqqun collective, the activists present at Agamben’s lecture failed to recognize this specific form of resistance. What Agamben attempted to show was that the power of the Tiqqun collective lay precisely in the fact that they did not prescribe any concrete actions but sought unexpected possibilities in ‘being-thus’. In that same sense, Agamben’s analysis of Kafka’s work should not be seen as a manual for activist freedom but as a description of small opportunities, of examples in which the power relation is diffuse and that we must attempt to recognize, create and use. Agamben shows us different possibilities and means for resistance, but these are not regular acts with a goal; rather, they are means without end. As Kishik pointed out, Agamben’s work is an attempt to ‘“ make means meet” (not with their ends, but with each other)’. 7 One way to achieve this is through gestures. The gestures of the people in the Oklahoma theatre and elsewhere in Kafka’s work, the shame of Joseph K. and the ‘as not’ in Kafka’s ‘On Parables’ show us that there are other strategies, aside from active resistance, to reverse political situations.

### 4

#### NEOLIBERALISM

#### The 1AC reduced difference to a question of knowledge/power relations that occur on a discursive terrain; politics are material and that reality is shaped by economic structures of power. Voting affirmative reinscribes a neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free market capitalism.

**Scatamburlo-D’Annibale et al., Windsor Communication and Social Justice graduate program chair, 2003**

(Valerie, “The Strategic Centrality of Class in the Politics of “Race” and “Difference”, Critical Methodologies, 3.2, <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/mclaren/mclaren%20and%20valerie.pdf>, ldg)

We stubbornly believe that the insights of Marx and those working within the broad parameters of that tradition still have something to say despite proclamations to the contrary. Indeed, perhaps one of the most taken-for-granted features of contemporary social theory (especially the variety that purports to be “radical”) is the ritualistically dismissive and increasingly generic critique of Marxism in terms of its alleged failure to address forms of oppression other than that of “class.” Marxism is considered to be theoretically bankrupt and intellectually passé, and class analysis is often savagely lampooned as a rusty weapon wielded clumsily by those mind locked in the jejune factories of the 19th and 20th centuries. When Marxist class analysis has not been distorted or equated with some crude version of “economic determinism,” teleology or essentialism, it has been attacked for diverting attention away from the categories of “difference”—including “race” (Gimenez, 2001).1 To overcome the presumed inadequacies of Marxism, an entire discursive apparatus sometimes called “post-Marxism” has arisen to fill the void. Regardless of Marx’s enduring relevance (cf. Greider, 1998) and despite the fact that much of post-Marxism is actually an outlandish “caricature” of Marx and the entire Marxist tradition, it has eaten through the “left like a cancer” and has “established itself as the new common sense” (Johnson, 2002, p. 129). Eager to take a wide detour around political economy, post-Marxists (who often go by other names such as postmodernists, poststructuralists, radical multiculturalists, etc.) tend to assume that the principal political points of departure must necessarily be “cultural.” Many but not all post-Marxists have gravitated toward a politics of difference that is largely premised on uncovering relations of power that reside in a variety of cultural and ideological practices (cf. Jordan &Weedon, 1995). Advocates of difference politics posit their ideas as bold steps forward in advancing the interests of those historically marginalized by dominant social and cultural narratives. Various strands of post-Marxism have undoubtedly advanced our knowledge of the hidden trajectories of power and their fetishizing instrumentalities within the processes of representation, and they remain somewhat useful in discerning the relationships between difference, language, and cultural configurations. At the same time, however, the rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists—enamored with the cultural and seemingly blind to the economic—have been woefully remiss in addressing the constitution of class formations and the stark reality of contemporary conditions under global capitalism. In some instances, capitalism and class relations have been thoroughly “otherized;” in others, class is reduced to “classism” and summoned only as part of the triumvirate of race, class, and gender in which class is portrayed as merely another form of difference. As we hope to show, the radical displacement of class analysis in contemporary theoretical narratives and the concomitant decentering of capitalism, the anointing of difference as a primary explanatory construct, and the “culturalization” of politics have had detrimental effects on “Left” theory and practice. The concept of difference has been one of the most potent weapons in the theoretical arsenal of those seeking to dismantle the contributions of the philosophes of the European Enlightenment as well as the revolutionary corpus of the Marxist tradition.2 For the most part, the issue of difference has been taken up around two basic constellations. First, it has been used to (a) contest liberal humanism’s notion of a unified and static subjectivity; (b) elaborate an understanding of subjectivity as fractured, multiple, and fluid; and (c) examine the discursive constitution of the subject within language itself. The second approach to difference has generally revolved around differences between groups (particularly as they pertain to race, ethnicity, etc.), resulting in discourses of “identity” politics. Of course, in political terms there has been an increasingly fierce divide between how these two approaches to difference operate in relation to “identity” (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000).3 It is clearly beyond the parameters of this article to explore these debates. Although there are significant distinctions between these variant positions, it is important to note that both converge to the extent that they valorize difference and heterogeneity as animating principles and in doing so have largely displaced the concept of class and the analysis of capitalism from the theoretical and political canvas. Our purpose here is not to rehash those well-worn debates or challenge their tenability. Rather, we view this effort, however partial, as a beginning—a point from which to launch a reconceptualization of difference. For the most part, contemporary narratives have stressed the cultural dimensions of difference while marginalizing and, in some cases, ignoring its economic and material dimensions. This posturing has been quite evident in many post-al theories of “race” and in the realm of “ludic” cultural studies that have valorized accounts of difference in almost exclusively “superstructuralist” terms (Sahay, 1998). But this treatment of difference and claims about “the ‘relative autonomy’ of ‘race’ have been enabled by a reduction and distortion of Marxian class analysis” that involves “equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism” (Meyerson, 2000). The key move in this distorting gesture depends on the “view that the economic is the base, the cultural/political/ ideological the superstructure.” It is then “relatively easy to show that the (presumably non-political) economic bases does not cause the political/cultural/ ideological superstructure, that the latter is/are not epiphenomenal but rela-tively autonomous or autonomous causal categories” (Meyerson, 2000, p. 2). In such formulations, the “cultural” is treated as a separate and autonomous sphere, severed from its embeddedness within sociopolitical and economic arrangements. As a result, “culturalist” narratives have produced autonomist and reified conceptualizations of difference that “far from enabling those subjects most marginalized by racial difference” have in effect reduced “difference to a question of knowledge/power relations” that can presumably be “dealt with (negotiated) on a discursive level without a fundamental change in the relations of production” (Sahay, 1998, p. 10). To suggest that culture is generally conditioned/shaped by material forces and social relations linked to production does not reinscribe the simplistic and presumably deterministic base/superstructure metaphor, which has plagued some strands of Marxist theory. Rather, such a formulation draws on Marx’s own writings from both the Grundrisse (Marx, 1858/1973) and Capital (Marx, 1867/1967) in which he contended that there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex variety of its “empirical” reality.4 This emphasizes Marx’s understanding of capitalism and capital as a “social” relation—one that stresses the interpenetration of these categories and one that offers a unified and dialectical analysis of history, ideology, culture, politics, economics, and society (see Marx, 1863/1972, 1867/1976a, 1866/1976b, 1865/1977a, 1844/1977b). Moreover, foregrounding the limitations of “difference” and “representational” politics does not suggest a disavowal of the importance of cultural and/or discursive arena(s) as sites of contestation. We readily acknowledge the significance of theorizations that have sought to valorize precisely those forms of difference that have historically been denigrated. They have helped to uncover the genealogy of terror hidden within the drama of Western democratic life. This has been an important development that has enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their individual and collective identities (Bannerji, 1995; Scatamburlo-D’Annibale & Langman, 2002). Contemporary theorists have also contributed to our understanding of issues of “otherness” and “race” as hegemonic articulations (Hall, 1980, 1987, 1988), the cultural politics of race and racism and the implications of raciology (Gilroy, 1990, 2000), as well as the epistemological violence perpetrated by Western theories of knowledge (Goldberg, 1990, 1993). Miron and Inda’s (2000) work, drawing on Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, has been insightful in showing how race works to constitute the racial subject through a reiterative discursive practice that achieves its effect through the act of naming and the practice of shaming. Hence, we would not discount the salience of such concerns, but nor should progressives be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the discursive/ cultural/textual realms. Such approaches have sometimes tended to redefine politics as a signifying activity generally confined to the realm of “representation” while displacing a politics grounded in the mobilization of forces against the material sources of political and economic marginalization. In this regard, textual/discursive politics have their limitations for they fail to guarantee the “material power necessary for social flourishing and living freely” (Goldberg, 1994, p. 13).5 In their rush to avoid the “capital” sin of “economism,” far too many post-al theorists (who often ignore their own class privilege) have fallen prey to an ahistorical form of culturalism that holds, among other things, that cultural antagonism external to class analysis and struggle provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics. In many respects, this posturing has yielded an intellectual pseudopolitics that has served to empower “the theorist while explicitly disempowering” real citizens (Turner, 1994, p. 410). Although space limitations prevent us from elaborating this point further, we contend that such positions are deeply problematic in terms of their penchant for de-emphasizing the totalizing (yes totalizing!) power and function of capital and for their attempts to employ culture as a construct that would diminish the centrality of class.6 In a proper historical materialist account, “culture” is not the “other” of class but rather constitutes part of a more comprehensive theorization of class relations in different contexts (cf. Scatamburlo-D’Annibale & Langman, 2002). Because post-al theories of difference often circumvent the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of difference from analyses of class formation and capitalist social relations, we contend that it is necessary to (re)conceptualize difference by drawing on Marx’s materialist and historical formulations. Difference needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. Because systems of difference almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in specific contexts. Drawing on the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle the categorical (and sometimes overly rigid) approaches to both class and difference for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies at the heart of our politics—that it was absurd to choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will, and historical or structural determination. In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see “difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics” (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji has pointed to the need to historicize difference in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies) and to acknowledge the changing configurations of difference and “otherness.” Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (a) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (b) the meanings and connotations that are attached to categories of difference; (c) how differences are produced out of, and lived within, specific his-torical, social, and political formations; and (d) the production of difference in relation to the complexities, contradictions, and exploitative relations of capitalism. Moreover, it presents a challenge to “identitarian” understandings of difference based almost exclusively on questions of cultural and/or racial hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). Much of what is called the “politics of difference” is little more than a demand for an end to monocultural quarantine and for inclusion into the metropolitan salons of bourgeois representation—a posture that reinscribes a neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free market capitalism. In short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace, and freedom amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their different “cultural” goods. A paradigmatic expression of this position is encapsulated in the following passage that champions a form of difference politics whose presumed aim is to make social groups appear. Minority and immigrant ethnic groups have laid claim to the street as a legitimate forum for the promotion and exhibition of traditional dress, food, and culture. . . . [This] is a politics of visibility and invisibility. Because it must deal with a tradition of representation that insists on subsuming varied social practices to a standard norm, its struggle is as much on the page, screen . . . as it is at the barricade and in the parliament, traditional forums of political intervention before the postmodern. (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000, p. 150) This position fosters a “fetishized” understanding of difference in terms of primordial and seemingly autonomous cultural identities and treats such “differences” as inherent, as ontologically secure cultural traits of the individuals of particular cultural communities. Rather than exploring the construction of difference within specific contexts mediated by the conjunctural embeddedness of power differentials, we are instead presented with an overflowing cornucopia of cultural particularities that serve as markers of ethnicity, race, group boundaries, and so forth. In this instance, the discourse of difference operates ideologically—cultural recognition derived from the rhetoric of tolerance averts our gaze from relations of production and presents a strategy for attending to difference as solely an ethnic, racial, or cultural issue. What advocates of such an approach fail to acknowledge is that the forces of diversity and difference are allowed to flourish provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism of difference politics cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of ideas and cultural practices. In fact, the post-al themes of identity, difference, diversity, and the like mesh quite nicely with contemporary corporate interests precisely because they revere lifestyle—the quest for, and the cultivation of, the self—and often encourage the fetishization of identities in the marketplace as they compete for “visibility” (Boggs, 2000; Field, 1997). Moreover, the uncritical, celebratory tone of various forms of difference politics can also lead to some disturbing conclusions. For example, if we take to their logical conclusion the statements that “postmodern political activism fiercely contests the reduction of the other to the same,” that post-al narratives believe that “difference needs to be recognized and respected at all levels” (Fuery &Mansfield, 2000, p. 148), and that the recognition of different subject positions is paramount (Mouffe, 1988, pp. 35-36), their political folly becomes clear. Eagleton (1996) sardonically commented on the implications: Almost all postmodern theorists would seem to imagine that difference, variability and heterogeneity are “absolute” goods, and it is a position I have long held myself. It has always struck me as unduly impoverishing of British social life that we can muster a mere two or three fascist parties. . . . The opinion that plurality is a good in itself is emptily formalistic and alarmingly unhistorical. (pp. 126-127) The liberal pluralism manifest in discourses of difference politics often means a plurality without conflict, contestation, or contradiction. The inherent limitations of this position are also evident if we turn our attention to issues of class. Expanding on Eagleton’s observations and adopting the logic that seems to inform the unqualified celebration of difference, one would be compelled to champion class differences as well. Presumably, the differences between the 475 billionaires whose combined wealth now equals the combined yearly incomes of more than 50% of the world’s population are to be celebrated—a posturing that would undoubtedly lend itself to a triumphant endorsement of capitalism and inequitable and exploitative conditions. San Juan (1995) noted that the cardinal flaw in current instantiations of culturalism lies in its decapitation of discourses of intelligibility from the politics of antagonistic relations. He framed the question quite pointedly: “In a society stratified by uneven property relations, by asymmetrical allocation of resources and of power, can there be equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences?” (pp. 232- 233).

#### Not basing race in political economy creates a culture politics focused on representation, subversion and individual relations which normalizes neoliberal hegemony-this culminates in a leveling of the play field of how one relates to neoliberal violence instead of a new positive vision of society

**Reed, Pennsylvania political science professor specializing in race and American politics, 2013**

(Adolph, “Django Unchained, or, The Help: How “Cultural Politics” Is Worse Than No Politics at All, and Why”, http://nonsite.org/feature/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why)

In both films the bogus happy endings are possible only because they characterize their respective regimes of racial hierarchy in the superficial terms of interpersonal transactions. In The Help segregationism’s evil was small-minded bigotry and lack of sensitivity; it was more like bad manners than oppression. In Tarantino’s vision, slavery’s definitive injustice was its gratuitous and sadistic brutalization and sexualized degradation. Malevolent, ludicrously arrogant whites owned slaves most conspicuously to degrade and torture them. Apart from serving a formal dinner in a plantation house—and Tarantino, the Chance the Gardener of American filmmakers (and Best Original Screenplay? Really?) seems to draw his images of plantation life from Birth of a Nation and Gone With the Wind, as well as old Warner Brothers cartoons—and the Mandingo fighters and comfort girls, Tarantino’s slaves do no actual work at all; they’re present only to be brutalized. In fact, the cavalier sadism with which owners and traders treat them belies the fact that slaves were, first and foremost, capital investments. It’s not for nothing that New Orleans has a monument to the estimated 20,000-30,000 antebellum Irish immigrants who died constructing the New Basin Canal; slave labor was too valuable for such lethal work. The Help trivializes Jim Crow by reducing it to its most superficial features and irrational extremes. The master-servant nexus was, and is, a labor relation. And the problem of labor relations particular to the segregationist regime wasn’t employers’ bigoted lack of respect or failure to hear the voices of the domestic servants, or even benighted refusal to recognize their equal humanity. It was that the labor relation was structured within and sustained by a political and institutional order that severely impinged on, when it didn’t altogether deny, black citizens’ avenues for pursuit of grievances and standing before the law. The crucial lynchpin of that order was neither myopia nor malevolence; it was suppression of black citizens’ capacities for direct participation in civic and political life, with racial disfranchisement and the constant threat of terror intrinsic to substantive denial of equal protection and due process before the law as its principal mechanisms. And the point of the regime wasn’t racial hatred or enforced disregard; its roots lay in the much more prosaic concern of dominant elites to maintain their political and economic hegemony by suppressing potential opposition and in the linked ideal of maintaining access to a labor force with no options but to accept employment on whatever terms employers offered. (Those who liked The Help or found it moving should watch The Long Walk Home, a 1990 film set in Montgomery, Alabama, around the bus boycott. I suspect that’s the film you thought you were watching when you saw The Help.) Django Unchained trivializes slavery by reducing it to its most barbaric and lurid excesses. Slavery also was fundamentally a labor relation. It was a form of forced labor regulated—systematized, enforced and sustained—through a political and institutional order that specified it as a civil relationship granting owners absolute control over the life, liberty, and fortunes of others defined as eligible for enslavement, including most of all control of the conditions of their labor and appropriation of its product. Historian Kenneth M. Stampp quotes a slaveholder’s succinct explanation: “‘For what purpose does the master hold the servant?’ asked an ante-bellum Southerner. ‘Is it not that by his labor, he, the master, may accumulate wealth?’”1 That absolute control permitted horrible, unthinkable brutality, to be sure, but perpetrating such brutality was neither the point of slavery nor its essential injustice. The master-slave relationship could, and did, exist without brutality, and certainly without sadism and sexual degradation. In Tarantino’s depiction, however, it is not clear that slavery shorn of its extremes of brutality would be objectionable. It does not diminish the historical injustice and horror of slavery to note that it was not the product of sui generis, transcendent Evil but a terminus on a continuum of bound labor that was more norm than exception in the Anglo-American world until well into the eighteenth century, if not later. As legal historian Robert Steinfeld points out, it is not so much slavery, but the emergence of the notion of free labor—as the absolute control of a worker over her person—that is the historical anomaly that needs to be explained.2 Django Unchained sanitizes the essential injustice of slavery by not problematizing it and by focusing instead on the extremes of brutality and degradation it permitted, to the extent of making some of them up, just as does The Help regarding Jim Crow. The Help could not imagine a more honest and complex view of segregationist Mississippi partly because it uses the period ultimately as a prop for human interest cliché, and Django Unchained’s absurdly ahistorical view of plantation slavery is only backdrop for the merger of spaghetti western and blaxploitation hero movie. Neither film is really about the period in which it is set. Film critic Manohla Dargis, reflecting a decade ago on what she saw as a growing Hollywood penchant for period films, observed that such films are typically “stripped of politics and historical fact…and instead will find meaning in appealing to seemingly timeless ideals and stirring scenes of love, valor and compassion” and that “the Hollywood professionals who embrace accuracy most enthusiastically nowadays are costume designers.”3 That observation applies to both these films, although in Django concern with historically accurate representation of material culture applies only to the costumes and props of the 1970s film genres Tarantino wants to recall. To make sense of how Django Unchained has received so much warmer a reception among black and leftoid commentators than did The Help, it is useful to recall Margaret Thatcher’s 1981 dictum that “economics are the method: the object is to change the soul.”4 Simply put, she and her element have won. Few observers—among opponents and boosters alike—have noted how deeply and thoroughly both films are embedded in the practical ontology of neoliberalism, the complex of unarticulated assumptions and unexamined first premises that provide its common sense, its lifeworld. Objection to The Help has been largely of the shooting fish in a barrel variety: complaints about the film’s paternalistic treatment of the maids, which generally have boiled down to an objection that the master-servant relation is thematized at all, as well as the standard, predictable litany of anti-racist charges about whites speaking for blacks, the film’s inattentiveness to the fact that at that time in Mississippi black people were busily engaged in liberating themselves, etc. An illustration of this tendency that conveniently refers to several other variants of it is Akiba Solomon, “Why I’m Just Saying No to ‘The Help’ and Its Historical Whitewash” in Color Lines,August 10, 2011, available at:http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/08/why\_im\_just\_saying\_no\_to\_the\_help.html. Defenses of Django Unchained pivot on claims about the social significance of the narrative of a black hero. One node of this argument emphasizes the need to validate a history of autonomous black agency and “resistance” as a politico-existential desideratum. It accommodates a view that stresses the importance of recognition of rebellious or militant individuals and revolts in black American history. Another centers on a notion that exposure to fictional black heroes can inculcate the sense of personal efficacy necessary to overcome the psychological effects of inequality and to facilitate upward mobility and may undermine some whites’ negative stereotypes about black people. In either register assignment of social or political importance to depictions of black heroes rests on presumptions about the nexus of mass cultural representation, social commentary, and racial justice that are more significant politically than the controversy about the film itself. In both versions, this argument casts political and economic problems in psychological terms. Injustice appears as a matter of disrespect and denial of due recognition, and the remedies proposed—which are all about images projected and the distribution of jobs associated with their projection—look a lot like self-esteem engineering. Moreover, nothing could indicate more strikingly the extent of neoliberal ideological hegemony than the idea that the mass culture industry and its representational practices constitute a meaningful terrain for struggle to advance egalitarian interests. It is possible to entertain that view seriously only by ignoring the fact that the production and consumption of mass culture is thoroughly embedded in capitalist material and ideological imperatives. That, incidentally, is why I prefer the usage “mass culture” to describe this industry and its products and processes, although I recognize that it may seem archaic to some readers. The mass culture v. popular culture debate dates at least from the 1950s and has continued with occasional crescendos ever since.5 For two decades or more, instructively in line with the retreat of possibilities for concerted left political action outside the academy, the popular culture side of that debate has been dominant, along with its view that the products of this precinct of mass consumption capitalism are somehow capable of transcending or subverting their material identity as commodities, if not avoiding that identity altogether. Despite the dogged commitment of several generations of American Studies and cultural studies graduate students who want to valorize watching television and immersion in hip-hop or other specialty market niches centered on youth recreation and the most ephemeral fads as both intellectually avant-garde and politically “resistive,” it should be time to admit that that earnest disposition is intellectually shallow and an ersatz politics. The idea of “popular” culture posits a spurious autonomy and organicism that actually affirm mass industrial processes by effacing them, especially in the putatively rebel, fringe, or underground market niches that depend on the fiction of the authentic to announce the birth of new product cycles. The power of the hero is a cathartic trope that connects mainly with the sensibility of adolescent boys—of whatever nominal age. Tarantino has allowed as much, responding to black critics’ complaints about the violence and copious use of “nigger” by proclaiming “Even for the film’s biggest detractors, I think their children will grow up and love this movie. I think it could become a rite of passage for young black males.”6 This response stems no doubt from Tarantino’s arrogance and opportunism, and some critics have denounced it as no better than racially presumptuous. But he is hardly alone in defending the film with an assertion that it gives black youth heroes, is generically inspirational or both. Similarly, in a January 9, 2012 interview on the Daily Show, George Lucas adduced this line to promote his even more execrable race-oriented live-action cartoon, Red Tails, which, incidentally, trivializes segregation in the military by reducing it to a matter of bad or outmoded attitudes. The ironic effect is significant understatement of both the obstacles the Tuskegee airmen faced and their actual accomplishments by rendering them as backdrop for a blackface, slapped-together remake of Top Gun. (Norman Jewison’s 1984 film, A Soldier’s Story, adapted from Charles Fuller’s A Soldier’s Play, is a much more sensitive and thought-provoking rumination on the complexities of race and racism in the Jim Crow U.S. Army—an army mobilized, as my father, a veteran of the Normandy invasion, never tired of remarking sardonically, to fight the racist Nazis.) Lucas characterized his film as “patriotic, even jingoistic” and was explicit that he wanted to create a film that would feature “real heroes” and would be “inspirational for teenage boys.” Much as Django Unchained’s defenders compare it on those terms favorably to Lincoln, Lucas hyped Red Tails as being a genuine hero story unlike “Glory, where you have a lot of white officers running those guys into cannon fodder.” Of course, the film industry is sharply tilted toward the youth market, as Lucas and Tarantino are acutely aware. But Lucas, unlike Tarantino, was not being defensive in asserting his desire to inspire the young; he offered it more as a boast. As he has said often, he’d wanted for years to make a film about the Tuskegee airmen, and he reports that he always intended telling their story as a feel-good, crossover inspirational tale. Telling it that way also fits in principle (though in this instance not in practice, as Red Tails bombed at the box office) with the commercial imperatives of increasingly degraded mass entertainment. Dargis observed that the ahistoricism of the recent period films is influenced by market imperatives in a global film industry. The more a film is tied to historically specific contexts, the more difficult it is to sell elsewhere. That logic selects for special effects-driven products as well as standardized, decontextualized and simplistic—“universal”—story lines, preferably set in fantasy worlds of the filmmakers’ design. As Dargis notes, these films find their meaning in shopworn clichés puffed up as timeless verities, including uplifting and inspirational messages for youth. But something else underlies the stress on inspiration in the black-interest films, which shows up in critical discussion of them as well. All these films—The Help, Red Tails, Django Unchained, even Lincoln and Glory—make a claim to public attention based partly on their social significance beyond entertainment or art, and they do so because they engage with significant moments in the history of the nexus of race and politics in the United States. There would not be so much discussion and debate and no Golden Globe, NAACP Image, or Academy Award nominations for The Help, Red Tails, or Django Unchained if those films weren’t defined partly by thematizing that nexus of race and politics in some way. The pretensions to social significance that fit these films into their particular market niche don’t conflict with the mass-market film industry’s imperative of infantilization because those pretensions are only part of the show; they are little more than empty bromides, product differentiation in the patter of “seemingly timeless ideals” which the mass entertainment industry constantly recycles. (Andrew O’Hehir observes as much about Django Unchained, which he describes as “a three-hour trailer for a movie that never happens.”7) That comes through in the defense of these films, in the face of evidence of their failings, that, after all, they are “just entertainment.” Their substantive content is ideological; it is their contribution to the naturalization of neoliberalism’s ontology as they propagandize its universalization across spatial, temporal, and social contexts. Purportedly in the interest of popular education cum entertainment, Django Unchained and The Help, and Red Tails for that matter, read the sensibilities of the present into the past by divesting the latter of its specific historicity. They reinforce the sense of the past as generic old-timey times distinguishable from the present by superficial inadequacies—outmoded fashion, technology, commodities and ideas—since overcome. In The Help Hilly’s obsession with her pet project marks segregation’s petty apartheid as irrational in part because of the expense rigorously enforcing it would require; the breadwinning husbands express their frustration with it as financially impractical. Hilly is a mean-spirited, narrow-minded person whose rigid and tone-deaf commitment to segregationist consistency not only reflects her limitations of character but also is economically unsound, a fact that further defines her, and the cartoon version of Jim Crow she represents, as irrational. The deeper message of these films, insofar as they deny the integrity of the past, is that there is no thinkable alternative to the ideological order under which we live. This message is reproduced throughout the mass entertainment industry; it shapes the normative reality even of the fantasy worlds that masquerade as escapism. Even among those who laud the supposedly cathartic effects of Django’s insurgent violence as reflecting a greater truth of abolition than passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, few commentators notice that he and Broomhilda attained their freedom through a market transaction.8 This reflects an ideological hegemony in which students all too commonly wonder why planters would deny slaves or sharecroppers education because education would have made them more productive as workers. And, tellingly, in a glowing rumination in the Daily Kos, Ryan Brooke inadvertently thrusts mass culture’s destruction of historicity into bold relief by declaiming on “the segregated society presented” in Django Unchained and babbling on—with the absurdly ill-informed and pontifical self-righteousness that the blogosphere enables—about our need to take “responsibility for preserving racial divides” if we are “to put segregation in the past and fully fulfill Dr. King’s dream.”9 It’s all an indistinguishable mush of bad stuff about racial injustice in the old-timey days. Decoupled from its moorings in a historically specific political economy, slavery becomes at bottom a problem of race relations, and, as historian Michael R. West argues forcefully, “race relations” emerged as and has remained a discourse that substitutes etiquette for equality.10 This is the context in which we should take account of what “inspiring the young” means as a justification for those films. In part, the claim to inspire is a simple platitude, more filler than substance. It is, as I’ve already noted, both an excuse for films that are cartoons made for an infantilized, generic market and an assertion of a claim to a particular niche within that market. More insidiously, though, the ease with which “inspiration of youth” rolls out in this context resonates with three related and disturbing themes: 1) underclass ideology’s narratives—now all Americans’ common sense—that link poverty and inequality most crucially to (racialized) cultural inadequacy and psychological damage; 2) the belief that racial inequality stems from prejudice, bad ideas and ignorance, and 3) the cognate of both: the neoliberal rendering of social justice as equality of opportunity, with an aspiration of creating “competitive individual minority agents who might stand a better fighting chance in the neoliberal rat race rather than a positive alternative vision of a society that eliminates the need to fight constantly against disruptive market whims in the first place.”11 This politics seeps through in the chatter about Django Unchained in particular. Erin Aubry Kaplan, in the Los Angeles Times article in which Tarantino asserts his appeal to youth, remarks that the “most disturbing detail [about slavery] is the emotional violence and degradation directed at blacks that effectively keeps them at the bottom of the social order, a place they still occupy today.” Writing on the Institute of the Black World blog, one Dr. Kwa David Whitaker, a 1960s-style cultural nationalist, declaims on Django’s testament to the sources of degradation and “unending servitude [that] has rendered [black Americans] almost incapable of making sound evaluations of our current situations or the kind of steps we must take to improve our condition.”12 In its blindness to political economy, this notion of black cultural or psychological damage as either a legacy of slavery or of more indirect recent origin—e.g., urban migration, crack epidemic, matriarchy, babies making babies—comports well with the reduction of slavery and Jim Crow to interpersonal dynamics and bad attitudes. It substitutes a “politics of recognition” and a patter of racial uplift for politics and underwrites a conflation of political action and therapy. With respect to the nexus of race and inequality, this discourse supports victim-blaming programs of personal rehabilitation and self-esteem engineering—inspiration—as easily as it does multiculturalist respect for difference, which, by the way, also feeds back to self-esteem engineering and inspiration as nodes within a larger political economy of race relations. Either way, this is a discourse that displaces a politics challenging social structures that reproduce inequality with concern for the feelings and characteristics of individuals and of categories of population statistics reified as singular groups that are equivalent to individuals. This discourse has made it possible (again, but more sanctimoniously this time) to characterize destruction of low-income housing as an uplift strategy for poor people; curtailment of access to public education as “choice”; being cut adrift from essential social wage protections as “empowerment”; and individual material success as socially important role modeling. Neoliberalism’s triumph is affirmed with unselfconscious clarity in the ostensibly leftist defenses of Django Unchained that center on the theme of slaves’ having liberated themselves. Trotskyists, would-be anarchists, and psychobabbling identitarians have their respective sectarian garnishes: Trotskyists see everywhere the bugbear of “bureaucratism” and mystify “self-activity;” anarchists similarly fetishize direct action and voluntarism and oppose large-scale public institutions on principle, and identitarians romanticize essentialist notions of organic, folkish authenticity under constant threat from institutions. However, all are indistinguishable from the nominally libertarian right in their disdain for government and institutionally based political action, which their common reflex is to disparage as inauthentic or corrupt.

#### Radical opposition stabilizes neoliberalism

**Bluhdorn, Bath politics reader, 2007**

(Ingolfur, “Self-description, Self-deception, Simulation: A Systems-theoretical Perspective on Contemporary Discourses of Radical Change”, Social Movement Studies, May, ebsco, ldg)

In late-modern society, this external point of reference of the increasingly all-embracing economic system is rapidly disappearing. Ever accelerated processes of societal modernization can no longer convincingly be portrayed as pursuing any idealist project of modernity. Programmes of innovation no longer serve the incremental realization of any modernist values and ideals, but are a categorical imperative of the economic system (Blu¨hdorn, 2004a, 2006b). As democratic politics turns into political marketing and is guided by the metaphysics of economic competitiveness and growth, and as late-modern individuals construct their identity primarily through consumer choices, a crisis of self referentiality descends upon late-modern society. It affects all three of the central pillars of modernity: the economy, which loses its status as serving the individual; democratic politics, which loses its status as the centre of power and the agent of the more humane future society; and the individual, which loses its status as the ultimate value and foundation of modern society (Blu¨hdorn, 2004a, b, 2006a). Indeed, the attempt to disguise its self-referentiality has become a main preoccupation of late-modern society. The regeneration of difference, the stabilization of the dualisms of modernity, has become a major concern that Baudrillard aptly describes as ‘the characteristic hysteria of our time’ (2001, p. 183). Not coincidentally, the economy has never been more anxious to emphasize that it is serving the community and investing in people. And not coincidentally politicians and their parties have never been more concerned to convince the increasingly sceptical electorate that they do listen to the people, that they still have visions, projects and agency, and that it is worth voting for them. More than anything, the stabilization of the dualisms of modernity implies the stabilization of the Self that was once conceptualized as an autonomous entity (subject) vis-a`-vis the system, but that has in each of its activities and dimensions incrementally been permeated by the market. The stabilization or regeneration of the Self is a project that is equally vital for the economy which cannot function as an end in itself, for democratic politics that needs to provide evidence that it is working towards the implementation of ideals that are rooted in the Self, and for the contemporary individual that has learnt to consider itself as the ultimate purpose (the subject) of societal development rather than a (human) resource waiting to be exploited. In late-modern society, however, this stabilization of the vanishing Self can be achieved only through the stabilization and further development of the established patterns of consumption. As the market has colonized every niche of the individual’s life world, and as every human decision and activity is becoming a matter of product choices, alternative forms of identity construction and self-experience are neither easily available nor particularly attractive. Yet the established patterns of self-construction, which thus have to be defended and further developed at any price, have fundamental problems attached to them: ﬁrstly, the attempt to constitute, on the basis of product choices and acts of consumption, a Self and identity that are distinct from and autonomous vis-a`-vis the market is a contradiction in terms. Secondly, late-modern society’s established patterns of consumption are known to be socially exclusive and environmentally destructive. Despite all hopes for ecological modernization and revolutionary improvements in resource efﬁciency (e.g. Weizsa¨cker et al., 1998; Hawkenet al., 1999; Lomborg, 2001), physical environmental limits imply that the lifestyles and established patterns of consumption cherished by advanced modern societies cannot even be extended to all residents of the richest countries, let alone to the populations of the developing world. For the sake of the (re)construction of an ever elusive Self, in their struggle against self-referentiality and in pursuit of the regeneration of difference, late-modern societies are thus locked into the imperative of maintaining and further developing the principle of exclusion (Blu¨hdorn, 2002, 2003). At any price they have to, and indeed do, defend a lifestyle that requires ever increasing social inequality, environmental degradation, predatory resource wars, and the tight policing of potential internal and external enemies.14 For this effort, military and surveillance technology provide ever more sophisticated and efﬁcient means. Nevertheless, the principle of exclusion is ultimately still unsustainable, not only because of spiralling ‘security’ expenses but also because it directly contradicts the modernist notion of the free and autonomous individual that late-modern society desperately aims to sustain. For this reason, late-modern society is confronted with the task of having to sustain both the late-modern principle of exclusion as well as its opposite, i.e. the modernist principle of inclusion. Very importantly, the conﬂict between the principles of exclusion and inclusion is not simply one between different individuals, political actors or sections of society. Instead, it is a politically irresolvable conﬂict that resides right within the late-modern individual, the late-modern economy and late-modern politics. And if, as Touraine notes, late-modern society no longer believes in nor even desires political transcendence, the particular challenge is that the two principles can also no longer be attributed to different dimensions of time, i.e. the former to the present, and the latter to some future society. Instead, late-modern society needs to represent and reproduce itself and its opposite at the same time. If considered within this framework of this analysis, the function of Luhmann’s system of protest communication, or in the terms of this article, the signiﬁcance of late-modern societies’ discourses of radical change becomes immediately evident. At a stage when the possibility and desirability of transcending the principle of exclusion has been pulled into radical doubt but when, at the same time, the principle of inclusion is vitally important, **these discourses simulate the validity of the latter as a social ideal**. In other words, latemodern society reconciles the tension between the cherished but exclusive status quo – for which there is no alternative – and the non-existent inclusive alternative – on whose existence it depends – by means of simulation. The analysis of Luhmann’s work has demonstrated how the societal self-descriptions produced by the system of protest communication, or late-modern society’s discourses of radical change, fulﬁl this function exactly. They are an indispensable function system not so much because they help to resolve late-modern society’s problems of mal-coordination, but **because by performing the possibility of the alternative they help to cope with the fundamental problem of self-referentiality**. In this sense, late-modern society’s discourses of sustainability, democratic renewal, social inclusion or global justice, to name but a few, suggest that advanced modern society is working towards an environmentally and socially inclusive alternative – genuinely modern – society, but they do not deny the fact that the big utopia and project of late-modern society is the reproduction and further enhancement of the status quo, i.e. the sustainability of the principle of exclusion. Protest movements as networks of physical actors and actions complement the purely communicative discourses of radical change in that they bring their narrative and societal selfdescription to life. Whilst the declarations of institutionalized mainstream politics cannot escape the generalized suspicion that they are purely rhetorical, social movements provide an **arena for** the physical expression and experience of the **authenticity and reality of the alternative**, or at least of the reality of its possibility and the authenticity of the commitment to its realization. For late-modern individuals who seek to find their elusive identity in ever new acts of consumption, protest movements offer an opportunity to experience themselves as autonomous, as subjects, as actors, as distinct from and opposed to the all-embracing market. Social movements and the more or less institutionalized discourses of radical change thus transmute from germ cells of the alternative society into reserves of alterity, or **theme-parks for simulated alterity** (Blu¨hdorn, 2005a). This interpretation reflects Luhmann’s suggestion that contemporary discourses of radical change are not so much about the actual implementation of radical social change as about the ‘symbolism of the alternative’. And it nowappears that the societal self-descriptions they generate fulfil a vital function not in so far as they increase the reflexivity of late-modern society but in so far as they are arenas for the experience of simulated subjectivity, duality and modernity. They provide an opportunity to reconcile the cherished but exclusive status quo with the equally cherished but unsustainable belief in the inclusive alternative. Protest movements and **discourses of radical change are the implantation of the alternative into the system itself**, or the simulated reproduction of alterity fromthe system’s own resources. As the real alternatives to the system are utterly unattractive, disappearing fast, and indeed resisted and annihilated at any price, this internal simulation of alterity is becoming late-modern society’s only remaining way of coping with the threat of self-referentiality.

#### Neoliberalism prioritizes short term profit over the well-being of environment and human life-makes extinction inevitable

**Nhanenge, South Africa development studies masters, 2007**

(Jytte, “Ecofeminsm: Towards Integrating The Concerns Of Women, Poor People And Nature Into Development”, February, <http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1>, DOA: 7-4-12)

Generation of wealth was an important part of the Scientific Revolution and its modern society. The scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However, since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant relates to web-like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived. The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over emotion, self-interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, generate domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and environmental degradation. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is destroying society (women and Others) and nature. The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique is extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument, economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope. Each of the following 10 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically interconnected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of masculine forces that make economics dominant towards women, Others and nature. The first three sections intend to show that economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. The outcome of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs. Hence, a few individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. Thus, the false belief in eternal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth. The next section shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its extreme form lead to self-destruction. Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war. The next section is important as a means to understanding "rational" economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychological meaning of money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they cannot be separated. Thus, economic "rationality" and its focus on eternal wealth generation are based on personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with disastrous consequences. The focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world. The following three sections are intending to show that the new global capitalism is doing just that. First, the neo-liberal economical scheme is presented. Secondly, its application in the Third World as Structural Adjustment Programmes and as the New Economic Partnership for African Development is critiqued. Thirdly, the extreme application of the disturbed "rational" human mind, manifested in the form of an institutional psychopath "the corporation", is discussed. After concluding that economics is a patriarchal system of domination, alternative economic models, which can support women, Others and nature, are presented.

#### Their use of the ballot as a mode of resistance model is palliative and reaffirms the foundations of neoliberal ontology by valorizing a narrative of an individual overcoming oppression against all odds outside of state policy---their 1AC can easy be a sequel to atlas shrugged.

**Reed, Pennsylvania political science professor specializing in race and American politics, 2013**

(Adolph, “Django Unchained, or, The Help: How “Cultural Politics” Is Worse Than No Politics at All, and Why”, http://nonsite.org/feature/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why)

In addition to knee-jerk anti-statism, the objection that the slaves freed themselves, as it shows up in favorable comparison of Django Unchained to Lincoln, stems from a racial pietism that issued from the unholy union of cultural studies and black studies in the university. More than twenty years of “resistance” studies that find again and again, at this point ritualistically, that oppressed people have and express agency have contributed to undermining the idea of politics as a discrete sphere of activity directed toward the outward-looking project of affecting the social order, most effectively through creating, challenging or redefining institutions that anchor collective action with the objective of developing and wielding power. Instead, the notion has been largely evacuated of specific content at all. “Politics” can refer to whatever one wants it to; all that’s required is an act of will in making a claim. The fact that there has been no serious left presence with any political capacity in this country for at least a generation has exacerbated this problem. In the absence of dynamic movements that cohere around affirmative visions for making the society better, on the order of, say, Franklin Roosevelt’s 1944 “Second Bill of Rights,” and that organize and agitate around programs instrumental to pursuit of such visions, what remains is the fossil record of past movements—the still photo legacies of their public events, postures, and outcomes. Over time, the idea that a “left” is defined by commitment to a vision of social transformation and substantive program for realizing it has receded from cultural memory. Being on the left has become instead a posture, an identity, utterly disconnected from any specific practical commitments. Thus star Maggie Gyllenhaal and director Daniel Barnz defended themselves against complaints about their complicity in the hideously anti-union propaganda film *Won’t Back Down* **by adducing their identities as progressives**. Gyllenhaal insisted that the movie couldn’t be anti-union because “There’s no world in which I would ever, EVER make an anti-union movie. My parents are left of Trotsky.”15 Barnz took a similar tack: “I’m a liberal Democrat, very pro-union, a member of two unions. I marched with my union a couple of years ago when we were on strike.”16 And Kathryn Bigelow similarly has countered criticism that her *Zero Dark Thirty* justifies torture and American militarism more broadly by invoking her identity as “a lifelong pacifist.”17 Being a progressive is now more a matter of how one thinks about oneself than what one stands for or does in the world. The best that can be said for that perspective is that it registers acquiescence in defeat. It amounts to an effort to salvage an idea of a left by **reformulating it as a sensibility within neoliberalism rather than a challenge to it**. Gyllenhaal, Barnz, and Bigelow exemplify the power of ideology as a mechanism that **harmonizes the principles one likes to believe one holds with what advances one’s material interests;** they also attest to the fact that the transmutation of leftism into pure self-image exponentially increases the potential power of that function of ideology. Upton Sinclair’s quip—“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it”—takes on all the more force when applied not merely to actions or interpretations of an external world but to devoutly savored self-perception as well. That left political imagination now operates unself-consciously within the practical ontology of neoliberalism is also the most important lesson to be drawn from progressives’ discussion of Django Unchained and, especially, the move to compare it with Lincoln. Jon Wiener, writing in The Nation, renders the following comparisons: “In Spielberg’s film, the leading black female character is a humble seamstress in the White House whose eyes fill with tears of gratitude when Congress votes to abolish slavery. In Tarantino’s film, the leading female character (Kerry Washington) is a defiant slave who has been branded on the face as a punishment for running away, and is forced—by Leonardo DiCaprio—to work as a prostitute. In Spielberg’s film, old white men make history, and black people thank them for giving them their freedom. In Tarantino’s, a black gunslinger goes after the white slavemaster with homicidal vengeance.”18 Never mind that, for what it’s worth, Kerry Washington’s character, as she actually appears in the film, is mainly a cipher, a simpering damsel in distress more reminiscent of Fay Wray in the original King Kong than heroines of the blaxploitation era’s eponymous vehicles Coffy or Foxy Brown. More problematically, Wiener’s juxtapositions reproduce the elevation of private, voluntarist action as a politics—somehow more truly true or authentic, or at least more appealing emotionally—**over the machinations of government and institutional actors. That is a default presumption of the identitarian/culturalist left and is also a cornerstone of neoliberalism’s practical ontology.** In an essay on Lincoln published a month earlier, Wiener identifies as the central failing of the film its dedication “to the proposition that Lincoln freed the slaves” and concludes, after considerable meandering and nit-picking ambivalence that brings the term pettifoggery to mind, “slavery died as a result of the actions of former slaves.”19 This either/or construct is both historically false and wrong-headed, and it is especially surprising that a professional historian like Wiener embraces it. The claim that slaves’ actions were responsible for the death of slavery is not only inaccurate; it is a pointless and counterproductive misrepresentation. What purpose is served by denying the significance of the four years of war and actions of the national government of the United States in ending slavery? Besides, it was indeed the Thirteenth Amendment that abolished slavery. Slaves’ mass departure from plantations was self-emancipation, by definition. Their doing so weakened the southern economy and undermined the secessionists’ capacity to fight, and the related infusion of black troops into the Union army provided a tremendous lift both on the battlefield and for northern morale. How does noting that proximity of Union troops greatly emboldened that self-emancipation diminish the import of their actions? But it was nonetheless the Thirteenth Amendment that finally outlawed slavery once and for all in the United States and provided a legal basis for preempting efforts to reinstate it in effect. Moreover, for all the debate concerning Lincoln’s motives, the sincerity of his commitment to emancipation, and his personal views of blacks, and notwithstanding its technical limits with respect to enforceability, the Emancipation Proclamation emboldened black people, slave and free, and encouraged all slavery’s opponents. And, as Wiener notes himself, the proclamation tied the war explicitly to the elimination of slavery as a system. Firefly, or The Road to Serfdom So why is a tale about a manumitted slave/homicidal black gunslinger more palatable to a contemporary leftoid sensibility than either a similarly cartoonish one about black maids and their white employers or one that thematizes Lincoln’s effort to push the Thirteenth Amendment through the House of Representatives? The answer is, to quote the saccharine 1970s ballad, “Feelings, nothing more than feelings.” Wiener’s juxtapositions reflect the political common sense that gives pride of place to demonstrations of respect for the “voices” of the oppressed and recognition of their suffering, agency, and accomplishments. That common sense informs the proposition that providing inspiration has social or political significance. But it equally shapes the generic human-interest “message” of films like The Help that represent injustice as an issue of human relations—the alchemy that promises to reconcile social justice and capitalist class power as a win/win for everyone by means of attitude adjustments and deepened mutual understanding. That common sense underwrites the tendency to reduce the past to a storehouse of encouraging post-it messages for the present. It must, because the presumption that the crucial stakes of political action concern recognition and respect for the oppressed’s voices is a presentist view, and mining the past to reinforce it requires anachronism. The large struggles against slavery and Jim Crow were directed toward altering structured patterns of social relations anchored in law and state power, but stories of that sort are incompatible with both global marketing imperatives and the ideological predilections of neoliberalism and its identitarian loyal opposition. One can only shudder at the prospect of how Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 film, The Battle of Algiers, or Costa-Gavras’s State of Siege (1972) would be remade today. (Guy Ritchie’s and Madonna’s execrable 2002 remake of Lina Wertmüller’s 1974 film Swept Away may provide a clue; their abomination completely erases the original film’s complex class and political content and replaces it with a banal—aka “universal”—story of an encounter between an older woman and a younger man, while at the same time meticulously, almost eerily, reproducing, scene by scene, the visual structure of Wertmüller’s film.) Particularly as those messages strive for “universality” as well as inspiration, their least common denominator tends toward the generic story of individual triumph over adversity. But the imagery of the individual overcoming odds to achieve fame, success, or recognition also maps onto the fantasy of limitless upward mobility for enterprising and persistent individuals who persevere and remain true to their dreams. As such, it is neoliberalism’s version of an ideal of social justice, legitimizing both success and failure as products of individual character. When combined with a multiculturalist rhetoric of “difference” that reifies as autonomous cultures—in effect racializes—what are actually contingent modes of life reproduced by structural inequalities, this fantasy crowds inequality as a metric of injustice out of the picture entirely. This accounts for the popularity of reactionary dreck like Beasts of the Southern Wild among people who should know better. The denizens of the Bathtub actively, even militantly, choose their poverty and cherish it and should be respected and appreciated for doing so. But no one ever supposed that Leni Riefenstahl was on the left. The tale type of individual overcoming has become a script into which the great social struggles of the last century and a half have commonly been reformulated to fit the requirements of a wan, gestural multiculturalism. Those movements have been condensed into the personae of Great Men and Great Women—Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, Rosa Parks, Malcolm X, George Washington Carver, Martin Luther King, Jr., Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, Ella Baker, Fannie Lou Hamer and others—who seem to have changed the society apparently by virtue of manifesting their own greatness. The different jacket photos adorning the 1982 and 1999 editions of Doug McAdam’s well known sociological study of the civil rights movement, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, exemplify the shift. The first edition’s cover was a photo of an anonymous group of marching protesters; the second edition featured the (staged) photo—made iconic by its use in an Apple advertising campaign—of a dignified Rosa Parks sitting alone on the front seat of a bus looking pensively out the window.20 Ironically, the scholarly turn away from organizations and institutional processes to valorize instead the local and everyday dimensions of those movements may have exacerbated this tendency by encouraging a focus on previously unrecognized individual figures and celebrating their lives and “contributions.” Rather than challenging the presumption that consequential social change is made by the will of extraordinary individuals, however, this scholarship in effect validates it by inflating the currency of Greatness so much that it can be found any and everywhere. Giving props to the unrecognized or underappreciated has become a feature particularly of that scholarship that defines scholarly production as a terrain of political action in itself and aspires to the function of the “public intellectual.” A perusal of the rosters of African American History Month and Martin Luther King, Jr. Day speakers at any random sample of colleges and universities attests to how closely this scholar/activist turn harmonizes with the reductionist individualism of prosperity religion and the varieties of latter-day mind cure through which much of the professional-managerial stratum of all races, genders, and sexual orientations, narrates its understandings of the world.

#### The Roll of the ballot is to vote for the team that best presents a collective challenge to institutionalized neoliberalism. Rather than use identity as a starting point to inform critique, as intellectuals WE should reclaim a collective “we” to inform demands on the state

Biebricher, Celikates and Dean 12 (Jodi Dean is a Professor of political and media theory in Geneva Robin Celikates is Asso­ci­ate Pro­fessor of Social and Polit­ical Philo­sophy at the Uni­ver­sity of Ams­ter­dam and an asso­ci­ate member of the Insti­tute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Thomas Biebricher dir­ects the re­search group “Crisis and Normative Order — Varieties of ‘Neoliberalism’ in Transformation” at the Cluster of Excellence “Formation of Normative Orders” at the Goethe University, Frankfurt http://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/11/06/saying-we-again-a-conversation-with-jodi-dean-on-democracy-occupy-and-communism/)

Biebricher & Celikates (‘B&C’): You argue that demo­cracy is so in­tim­ately tied up with what you call ‘com­mu­nic­ative cap­it­alism’ that every at­tempt from the left to re-​appropriate the term, to give it a more rad­ical meaning and to dis­tin­guish it from the elect­oral re­gimes of rep­res­ent­ative demo­cracy has to fail. This seems dif­fi­cult to ac­cept for many people on the left.

Jodi Dean (‘JD’): There are a couple of reasons why I take this po­s­i­tion. First, and most broadly, democracy is not a category of contestation anymore. Right and left agree on democracy and use a democratic rhetoric to justify their positions. George Bush claimed to be de­fending demo­cracy all over the world by bombing all sorts of people. If that is demo­cracy, then that is not a lan­guage that the left can use to formulate an egalitarian and emancipatory potential or hope. A second reason, which is a re­per­cus­sion of the first one, is that democracy is a kind of ambient milieu, it’s the air we breathe, everything is put in terms of democracy nowadays. And this relates to the third reason: the rhetoric of democracy is particularly strong now in the way in which it is combined with the form of cap­it­alism I call ‘communicative capitalism’, where ideals of inclusion and participation, of making one’s voice heard and one’s opinion known are also used by TMobile and Apple. Participation ends up being the answer to everything. If that’s the case, referring to it is not making a cut with our dominant frame, it’s just reinforcing it. If gov­ern­ments and cor­por­a­tions are en­cour­aging one to par­ti­cipate then left­ists don’t add one thing that’s not already present if they say that what we need is to make sure that everyone is par­ti­cip­ating and in­cluded — that’s already what we have. For the left to be able to make a break we have to speak a language that is not already the one we’re in.

B&C: This sounds primarily like a stra­tegic or polit­ical reason for shifting the focus away from demo­cracy. But is there really some­thing fun­da­ment­ally wrong on a the­or­et­ical level with the more rad­ical no­tion of democracy?

JD: What’s wrong with the notion of democracy as even radical democrats have appropriated it is that it leaves cap­it­alism in place. The assumption is that if we have enough demo­cracy the problem of cap­it­alism will either go away or solve it­self — and that’s clearly false. Take Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: their idea of radical democracy is framed specifically to keep class from being a primary polit­ical de­term­in­a­tion. In the Frankfurt School tra­di­tion Habermas’s dis­tinc­tion between life-​world and system leaves cap­it­alism un­touched. The same is true for the focus on civil so­ciety which leaves the mode of pro­duc­tion out of the frame. So the the­or­et­ical reason for my skep­ti­cism is that the left has moved away from an ana­lysis and cri­tique of capitalism

B&C: You refer to demo­cracy as a ‘neo­lib­eral fantasy’ — could you ex­plain that no­tion a bit?

JD: The more neo-​liberalism has entrenched itself the more we have been hearing this lan­guage of democracy, as if participation was going to solve all problems — but this is a fantasy be­cause the fun­da­mental truth is that it is not going to solve these prob­lems. Keeping all the activity in the demo­cratic sphere makes it seem as if people are busy, en­gaged etc. without ever af­fecting the basic struc­ture. It’s a fantasy be­cause it func­tions like a screen.

B&C: Building on this dia­gnosis, you in­tro­duce an al­tern­ative vocab­u­lary with the term ‘com­munism’ at its center — a dif­fi­cult term, one could say, if only for stra­tegic pur­poses given that it is widely re­garded as his­tor­ic­ally discredited.

JD: First, there has been the re­turn of com­munism in the the­or­et­ical dis­cus­sion that started with the con­fer­ences Slavoj Zizek and Alain Badiou have or­gan­ized. Hardt and Negri have been talking about com­munism for a long time already. It’s im­portant to re­turn to the lan­guage of com­munism be­cause that is the one word that says ‘no to cap­it­alism’. No matter what, if people say that they are com­munist, you know that they are against private prop­erty and the private own­er­ship of the means of pro­duc­tion and for the people’s con­trol over these means. There’s no nu­ance about their re­la­tion to cap­it­alism, and that’s what is im­portant. A third reason is that the right in the US still be­lieves in it, they are con­stantly at­tacking com­munism which means that they know that it is the lan­guage of anti-​capitalism that ap­peals to some kind of eman­cip­atory egal­it­ari­anism. So I don’t think that com­munism is as dead as the left seems to as­sume. The right knows it’s alive.

B&C: This might of course be spe­cific to the US and a bit dif­ferent in Europe. But let’s turn to a more the­or­et­ical con­cern. We agree that the ana­lysis of cap­it­alism, and more gen­er­ally a Marxist per­spective on class so­ciety, is ab­so­lutely cru­cial and that this has been neg­lected or mar­gin­al­ized in a lot of radical-​democratic thought. But on the other hand it seems that the return to com­munism, e.g. in the work of Badiou, is also in a prob­lem­atic way de­tached from a social-​theoretical ana­lysis of so­ciety. The effect is that communism is understood in activist or voluntarist terms, as if we could just de­cide to es­tab­lish com­munism, whereas in the Marxist frame­work it was al­ways tied to both a socio-​theoretical ana­lysis and to ex­isting eman­cip­atory move­ments. Does com­munism re­turn as utopia in­stead of real movement?

JD: I don’t think this de­tach­ment is so char­ac­ter­istic of the re­turn of com­munism. It’s true that Badiou lacks any ac­count of the eco­nomy, but David Harvey has a strong Marxist ana­lysis of the eco­nomy that re­cog­nizes changes, such as the emer­gence of new places of struggle and or­gan­iz­a­tion such as the city. So here there is a socio-​economic an­chor and com­munism is not seen as free-​floating. The same is true for Hardt and Negri, par­tic­u­larly in Empire their ac­count, which goes back to the whole post-​autonomia dis­cus­sion and its ana­lysis of the so­cial factory, re­cog­nizes that there are socio-​economic changes and move­ments that can still be ana­lyzed with vari­ations of Marxist cat­egories and provide a loc­a­tion for some kind of com­munist move­ment. Another ques­tion is whether there is an active, vivid communist movement right now. That would probably be far-​fetched with regard to the US and Germany or the Netherlands — but look at other parts of the world such as Nepal and India or Greece. We go too quickly if we say that there is no social analysis or link with any real movements.

B&C: What about Occupy? Do you see a pos­sible link with the re­turn to com­munism or is it a demo­cratic movement?

JD: It’s a plural and open move­ment with mul­tiple tendencies.

B&C: That sounds like com­mu­nic­ative capitalism!

JD: You’re right, that’s a problem, and one of the views I often argue against is that Occupy is a ‘meme’ that jumped from the in­ternet onto the streets or that it’s primarily driven by so­cial media. I don’t think this is true. What made the move­ment work in the US was the re­la­tion to Wall Street, it wasn’t Occupy Capitol or Congress. That gives us the an­ti­cap­it­alist core that is the sub­stance of the move­ment even as all the other tend­en­cies some­times make us lose sight of that.

B&C: Can you say some­thing about the in­sti­tu­tional or or­gan­iz­a­tional struc­tures that the move­ment against cap­it­alism and for com­munism would have to have? You argue that we have to renew the idea of the party. Many will re­gard that with some skepticism!

JD: First on the idea of the party. Lukács is really great in his book Lenin: A Study on the Unicity of his Thought in re­cog­nizing that the party is a form for the ac­tu­ality of re­volu­tion, which means that it is a form that we need be­cause of the mul­ti­pli­city of people who be­come mo­bil­ized when a move­ment starts. Of course, they are going to bring all kinds of dif­ferent forms of con­scious­ness to the move­ment and that can easily be re­dir­ected and be­come a kind of pop­u­lism. So a party can be useful in trying to re­spond to this — not dog­mat­ic­ally but flex­ibly, trying to push and steer a little bit. But it should not and cannot get ahead of the people. It has to have a much more re­sponsive re­la­tion­ship to it, trying to direct in a re­sponsive way. So with re­gard to the first ques­tion I think that a party is ne­ces­sary and that we can re­cog­nize even in the old his­tory of Communist parties it was never as dog­matic, un­re­sponsive or rigid as the critics want us to think. Second, not a whole lot of people are ex­cited about the party idea; I’ll admit to that. But I think the ex­per­i­ence of Syriza can be made more in­spiring for people out­side of Greece. Because they see that there is a flex­ible left co­ali­tion that was able within four or five months to func­tion as a party and make real pro­gress. That would be different in the United States because we do not have a parliamentary system, so the incentives for the party form are not really there, which is a real problem. On the other hand, one of the experiences that has come out of ‘Occupy’ is that there needs to be a more explicit understanding of how leaders func­tion and arise so that leaders can be accountable and different people can move in and out of leadership positions, in an open, trans­parent and ac­count­able way. So I would hope that over the next year some more co­hesive or­gan­iz­a­tional form can emerge and I do not think that it hurts to call it a party.

B&C: Historically the role that Communist parties have played has often turned out to be anti-​revolutionary not only with re­spect to e.g. the more an­archist cur­rents in these re­volu­tionary move­ments but also in other ways. One might think that the council system would be a good al­tern­ative to the party form in terms of or­gan­izing the movement.

JD: I don’t think that the party form is op­posed to coun­cils, cells or so­viets. In October, I was reading Lenin’s April Theses and thought that the gen­eral as­sem­blies of Occupy are a new form of so­viet. All of these are units in which a party can func­tion or which can be com­pon­ents of a party. They are not op­posed to each other. I think Anarchists are too re­ductive here be­cause they treat the party as some­thing on top rather than some­thing within: an or­gan­iz­a­tion of voices within a broader field. I think it is a mis­take to build up this dichotomy.

B&C: But there do seem to be his­tor­ical and so­ci­olo­gical reasons to be skeptical.

JD: There have been mul­tiple kinds of parties. Even in the Soviet Union the party changed over time. It went from being a re­volu­tionary party with mul­tiple splits to one that be­came less tol­erant of vocal op­pos­i­tion within it to one that was a ruling bur­eau­cratic party to a bur­eau­cratic party that would also purge it­self and change over time. People act like freaks when it comes to Communism and in­stall a nar­row­ness and a de­term­inism that would be ana­thema in any other in­tel­lec­tual dis­cus­sion. I think it is really time to get out of that Cold War men­tality that lets us re­duce everything to one kind of bur­eau­cratic Stalinist party as if that were the only thing that a Communist party ever was.

B&C: Let us come back to the Occupy Movement once more. Maybe you could elab­orate a little more on where you see the sig­ni­fic­ance of the movement.

JD: The most im­portant thing about Occupy Wall Street is that it let the Left recognize itself as a Left again instead of speaking in terms of all these different identity categories splitting the Left and saying ad nauseum that there is no Left and that no one can say ‘we’. With Occupy Wall Street we can fi­nally say ‘we’ again. It really was a situ­ation where the ques­tion was: ‘are you for or against Occupy Wall Street?’ And people from a wide variety of po­s­i­tions on the Left ended up having to say, ‘Yes, we are for it’. Even if their accept­ance was qualified or critical, that ‘for or against’ became a dividing line. Occupy is an event partly be­cause of its ability to in­scribe this kind of di­vi­sion so people have to say whether they are for or against it: ‘Are you one of us or not?’ — even if the ‘us’ is amorphous, chan­ging and plural. But it was a really di­visive mo­ment in the very best pos­sible way. So first, its sig­ni­fic­ance lies in the way it gal­van­ized the Left. Naomi Klein said at the end of the first week of the oc­cu­pa­tion: ‘This is the most ex­citing thing in the world right now’, meaning for us in the US Left to have some­thing that was gal­van­izing and that was an opening. That is what I think of Occupy Wall Street as an evental form. I also think it is a polit­ical or­gan­iz­a­tion of the in­com­pat­ib­ility of cap­it­alism and demo­cracy. Its par­tic­ular form ties it to the con­tent of the gap between cap­it­alism and democracy.

B&C: One of the main cri­ti­cisms re­garding strategy that have been made is the ab­sence of an agenda or a set of demands.

JD: I was in the Demands Working Group, which died a really hor­rible death. It was about March and it was hor­rible to watch as it was painful and on­going. The problem of de­mands was ini­tially presented as if it wasn’t a problem but a choice: ‘We do not want to have demands because we are not addressing the state. Occupation is its own de­mand.’ But this was an unbelievably stupid thing to say because the reality was that the movement at its beginning was so inclusive and amorphous that it was not capable of making demands as a group. There was not enough of any kind of so­cial co­he­sion, any kind of common in­terest, from which de­mands could be for­mu­lated. Instead of ad­dressing that, the dis­cus­sion was formed around ‘de­mands are bad; any­body who wants us to make de­mands is trying to hi­jack the move­ment or elim­inate its potential.’

But what was also exciting about it initially was that not having demands created a space of desire so that the main­stream media and politicians went nuts. Everybody wanted to know: ‘What do they want?’ It was a wonderful proof of the truth of Lacanian theory’s ac­count of the gap of desire. There was this gap and it did incite a lot of enthusiasm and desire and that was good. It was ob­vi­ously not planned but there was an im­mense be­nefit to that open­ness. By early November, though, the demands group was frag­menting, the more lib­eral and in­de­pendent mem­bers would take everything that the rest said and would red-​bait it and say: ‘You guys are com­mun­ists; this will never wash with the 99%.’ And be­cause of the Anarchist prin­ciples of con­sensus that re­quired full or close to full agree­ment, they were able to block pro­posals nearly all the time. Other people were in the group con­stantly saying that the group should not exist and also blocking de­cisions. So that was a problem.

B&C: You said that Occupy en­abled the Left to say ‘we’ again. But isn’t one of the big achieve­ments of the his­tor­ical Left that it was al­ways wary of saying ‘we’ be­cause it was aware of the ex­clu­sions res­ulting from such a ‘we’? Is this aware­ness in­cor­por­ated into the move­ment and what are mech­an­isms ex­pressing it? How can we re­flect on these more prob­lem­atic as­pects of the ‘we’?

JD: First, there is a very concrete procedure for dealing with the potential problems of an exclusive ‘we’ that is called the ‘progressive stack’. If people want to speak in a general assembly they get ‘on stack’. The progressive stack makes sure that people who have not spoken and/​or are from historically disadvantaged or marginalized groups are moved up in the stack. That makes it impossible for privileged people to take up all the speaking time. Most working groups also ad­opted this mech­anism. Secondly, there were multiple groups that were focused on women in the movement, racial differences, problems and issues for the undocumented etc. So there were par­tic­ular caucuses and working groups on these very topics. So there was always self-​consciousness in the movement. The assump­tion that every­body just forgot fifty years of dif­fer­ence theory is ludicrous.

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## K

### K prior

**The driving course of the Filipino economy is nurses they train to send to other contries, a legacy of colonialism has drained their natural resources which locks them into a detrimental hierarchical relationship with other counties. This disproves their solvency and the necessity of placing class first in our analysis.**

**the right wing denies using race as their explanation for their adverse policies and codes their injustice in terms of economics, they say people have not been working hard enough. Putting calss at the forefront of our analysis is the best way to contest this framing**

**Reed, Pennsylvania political science professor, 2005**

(Adolph, “The Real Divide”, November, <http://progressive.org/mag_reed1105>, ldg)

Race in this context becomes a cheap and safely predictable alternative to pressing a substantive critique of the sources of this horror in New Orleans and its likely outcomes. Granted, the images projected from the Superdome, the convention center, overpasses, and rooftops seemed to cry out a stark statement of racial inequality. But that’s partly because in the contemporary U.S., race is the most familiar language of inequality or injustice. It’s what we see partly because it’s what we’re accustomed to seeing, what we look for. As I argued in The Nation, class—as income, wealth, and access to material resources, including a safety net of social connections—was certainly a better predictor than race of who evacuated the city before the hurricane, who was able to survive the storm itself, who was warehoused in the Superdome or convention center or stuck without food and water on the parched overpasses, who is marooned in shelters in Houston or elsewhere, and whose interests will be factored into the reconstruction of the city, who will be able to return. New Orleans is a predominantly black city, and it is a largely poor city. The black population is disproportionately poor, and the poor population is disproportionately black. It is not surprising that those who were stranded and forgotten, probably those who died, were conspicuously black and poor. None of that, however, means that race—or even racism —is adequate as an explanation of those patterns of inequality. And race is especially useless as a basis on which to craft a politics that can effectively pursue social justice. Before the “yes, buts” begin, I am not claiming that systemic inequalities in the United States are not significantly racialized. The evidence of racial disparities is far too great for any sane or honest person to deny, and they largely emerge from a history of discrimination and racial injustice. Nor am I saying that we should overlook that fact in the interest of some idealized nonracial or post-racial politics. Let me be blunter than I’ve ever been in print about what I am saying: As a political strategy, exposing racism is wrongheaded and at best an utter waste of time. It is the political equivalent of an appendix: a useless vestige of an earlier evolutionary moment that’s usually innocuous but can flare up and become harmful. There are two reasons for this judgment. One is that the language of race and racism is too imprecise to describe effectively even how patterns of injustice and inequality are racialized in a post-Jim Crow world. “Racism” can cover everything from individual prejudice and bigotry, unself-conscious perception of racial stereotypes, concerted group action to exclude or subordinate, or the results of ostensibly neutral market forces. It can be a one-word description and explanation of patterns of unequal distribution of income and wealth, services and opportunities, police brutality, a stockbroker’s inability to get a cab, neighborhood dislocation and gentrification, poverty, unfair criticism of black or Latino athletes, or being denied admission to a boutique. Because the category is so porous, it doesn’t really explain anything. Indeed, it is an alternative to explanation. Exposing racism apparently makes those who do it feel good about themselves. Doing so is cathartic, though safely so, in the same way that proclaiming one’s patriotism is in other circles. It is a summary, concluding judgment rather than a preliminary to a concrete argument. It doesn’t allow for politically significant distinctions; in fact, as a strategy, exposing racism requires subordinating the discrete features of a political situation to the overarching goal of asserting the persistence and power of racism as an abstraction. This leads to the second reason for my harsh judgment. Many liberals gravitate to the language of racism not simply because it makes them feel righteous but also because it doesn’t carry any political warrant beyond exhorting people not to be racist. In fact, it often is exactly the opposite of a call to action. Such formulations as “racism is our national disease” or similar pieties imply that racism is a natural condition. Further, it implies that most whites inevitably and immutably oppose blacks and therefore can’t be expected to align with them around common political goals. This view dovetails nicely with Democrats’ contention that the only way to win elections is to reject a social justice agenda that is stigmatized by association with blacks and appeal to an upper-income white constituency concerned exclusively with issues like abortion rights and the deficit. Upper-status liberals are more likely to have relatively secure, rewarding jobs, access to health care, adequate housing, and prospects for providing for the kids’ education, and are much less likely to be in danger of seeing their nineteen-year-old go off to Iraq. They tend, therefore, to have a higher threshold of tolerance for political compromises in the name of electing this year’s sorry pro-corporate Democrat. Acknowledging racism—and, of course, being pro-choice—is one of the few ways many of them can distinguish themselves from their Republican co-workers and relatives. As the appendix analogy suggests, insistence on understanding inequality in racial terms is a vestige of an earlier political style. The race line persists partly out of habit and partly because it connects with the material interests of those who would be race relations technicians. In this sense, race is not an alternative to class. The tendency to insist on the primacy of race itself stems from a class perspective. For roughly a generation it seemed reasonable to expect that defining inequalities in racial terms would provoke some, albeit inadequate, remedial response from the federal government. But that’s no longer the case; nor has it been for quite some time. That approach presumed a federal government that was concerned at least not to appear racially unjust. Such a government no longer exists. A key marker of the right’s victory in national politics is that the discussion of race now largely serves as a way to reinforce a message to whites that the public sector is there merely to help some combination of black, poor, and loser. Liberals have legitimized this perspective through their own racial bad faith. For many whites, the discussion of race also reinforces the idea that cutting public spending is justifiably aimed at weaning a lazy black underclass off the dole or—in the supposedly benign, liberal Democratic version—teaching them “personal responsibility.” New Orleans is instructive. The right has a built-in counter to the racism charge by mobilizing all the scurrilous racial stereotypes that it has propagated to justify attacks on social protection and government responsibility all along. Only those who already are inclined to believe that racism is the source of inequality accept that charge. For others, nasty victim-blaming narratives abound to explain away obvious racial disparities. What we must do, to pursue justice for displaced, impoverished New Orleanians as well as for the society as a whole, is to emphasize that their plight is a more extreme, condensed version of the precarious position of millions of Americans today, as more and more lose health care, bankruptcy protection, secure employment, afford¬able housing, civil liberties, and access to education. And their plight will be the future of many, many more people in this country once the bipartisan neoliberal consensus reduces government to a tool of corporations and the investor class alone.

### The AFF can’t turn the k---

#### Collectivity---the AFF is structured by neoliberalism to be a private expression of agency that doesn’t undermine neoliberalism’s underlying structures-only calls for new collectivism can solve.

**Giroux, McMaster university Chair in English and Cultural Studies, 2005**

(Henry, “The Terror of Neoliberalism: Rethinking the Significance of Cultural Politics”, College Literature 32.1, proquest, ldg)

Neoliberalism has indeed become a broad-based political and cultural movement designed to obliterate public concerns and liquidate the welfare state, and make politics everywhere an exclusively market-driven project (Leys 2001). But neoliberalism does more than make the market "the informing principle of politics" (Duggan 2003, 34), while allocating wealth and resources to those who are most privileged by virtue of their class, race, and power. Its supporting political culture and pedagogical practices also put into play a social universe and cultural landscape that sustain a particularly barbaric notion of authoritarianism, set in motion under the combined power of a religious and market fundamentalism and anti-terrorism laws that suspend civil liberties, incarcerate disposable populations, and provide the security forces necessary for capital to destroy those spaces where democracy can be nourished. All the while, the landscape and soundscape become increasingly homogenized through the spectacle of flags waving from every flower box, car, truck, and house, encouraged and supplemented by jingoistic bravado being broadcast by Fox Television News and Clear Channel radio stations. As a cultural politics and a form of economic domination, neoliberalism tells a very limited story, one that is antithetical to nurturing democratic identities, values, public spaces, and institutions and thereby enables fascism to grow because it has no ethical language for recognizing politics outside of the realm of the market, for controlling market excesses, or for challenging the underlying tenets of a growing authoritarianism bolstered by the pretense of religious piety. Neoliberal ideology, on the one hand, pushes for the privatization of all non-commodified public spheres and the upward distribution of wealth. On the other hand, it supports policies that increasingly militarize facets of public space in order to secure the privileges and benefits of the corporate elite and ultra-rich. Neoliberalism does not merely produce economic inequality, iniquitous power relations, and a corrupt political system; it also promotes rigid exclusions from national citizenship and civic participation. As Lisa Duggan points out, "Neoliberalism cannot be abstracted from race and gender relations, or other cultural aspects of the body politic. Its legitimating discourse, social relations, and ideology are saturated with race, with gender, with sex, with religion, with ethnicity, and nationality" (2003, xvi). Neoliberalism comfortably aligns itself with various strands of neoconservative and religious fundamentalisms waging imperial wars abroad as well as at home against those groups and movements that threaten its authoritarian misreading of the meaning of freedom, security, and productiveness. Neoliberalism has to be understood and challenged as both an economic theory and a powerful public pedagogy and cultural politics. That is, it has to be named and critically understood before it can be critiqued. The commonsense assumptions that legitimate neoliberalism's alleged historical inevitability have to be unsettled and then engaged for the social damage they cause at all levels of human existence. Such a recognition suggests identifying and critically examining the most salient and powerful ideologies that inform and frame neoliberalism. It also suggests a need on the part of progressives to make cultural politics and the notion of public pedagogy central to the struggle against neoliberalism, particularly since education and culture now play such a prominent political and economic role in both securing consent and producing capital (Peters 2002). In fact, this implies as Susan Buck-Morss has insisted that "[t]he recognition of cultural domination as just as important as, and perhaps even as the condition of possibility of, political and economic domination is a true 'advance' in our thinking" (2003, 103). Of course, this position is meant not to disavow economic and institutional struggles but to supplement them with a cultural politics that connects symbolic power and its pedagogical practices with material relations of power. Engaging the cultural politics and economics of neoliberalism also points to the need for progressives to analyze how neoliberal policies work at the level of everyday life through the language of privatization and the lived cultural forms of class, race, gender, youth, and ethnicity. Finally, such a project must employ a language of critique and possibility, engagement and hope as part of a broader project of viewing democracy as a site of intense struggle over matters of representation, participation, and shared power. Central to the critique of neoliberalism is the belief, as Alain Touraine argues, that neoliberal globalization has not "dissolved our capacity for political action" (2001, 2). Such action depends on the ability of various groups-the peace movement, the anti-corporate globalization movement, the human rights movement, the environmental justice movement-within and across national boundaries-to form alliances in which matters of community and solidarity provide a common symbolic space and multiple public spheres where norms are created, debated, and engaged as part of an attempt to develop a new political language, culture, and set of relations. Such efforts must be understood as part of a broader attempt not only to collectively struggle against domination, but also to defend all those social advances that strengthen democratic public spheres and services, demand new rights, establish modes of power sharing, and create notions of social justice adequate to imagining and sustaining democracy on a global level. Consider, for example, the anti-corporate globalization movement's slogan "Another World is Possible!" which demands, as Alex Callinicos insightfully points out, a different kind of social logic, a powerful sense of unity and solidarity. Another world-that is, a world based on different social logic, run according to different priorities from those that prevail today. It is easy enough to specify what the desiderata of such an alternative social logic would be-social justice, economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and democracy-but much harder to spell out how a reproducible social system embodying these requirements could be built. And then there is the question of how to achieve it. Both these questions-What is the alternative to capitalism? What strategy can get us there?-can be answered in different ways. One thing the anti-capitalist movement is going to have to learn is how to argue through the differences that exist and will probably develop around such issues without undermining the very powerful sense of unity that has been one of the movement's most attractive qualities. (Callinicos 2003, 147) Callinicos's insight suggests that any viable struggle against neoliberal capitalism will have to rethink "the entire project of politics within the changed conditions of a global public sphere, and to do this democratically, as people who speak different political languages, but whose goals are nonetheless the same: global peace, economic justice, legal equality, democratic participation, individual freedom, mutual respect" (Buck-Morss 2003, 4-5). One of the most central tasks facing intellectuals, activists, educators, and others who believe in an inclusive and substantive democracy is the need to use theory to rethink the language and possibilities of politics as a way to imagine a future outside the powerful grip of neoliberalism and the impending authoritarianism that has a different story to tell about the future, one that reinvents the past in the image of the crude exercise of power and the unleashing of unimaginable human suffering. Critical reflection and social action in this discourse must acknowledge how the category of the global public sphere extends the space of politics beyond the boundaries of local resistance. Evidence of such actions can be found in the World Social Forums that took place in 2003 in Porto Alegre, Brazil and in Hyderabad, India in 2004. Successful forms of global dissent can also be observed in the international campaign to make AIDS drugs affordable for poor countries as well as in the international demonstrations against multinational corporations in cities from Melbourne and Seattle to Genoa and New York City. New alliances among intellectuals, students, labor unions, and environmentalists are taking place in the streets of Argentina, the West Bank, and in many other places fighting globalization from above. At the same time, a new language of agency and resistance is emerging among many activists and is being translated into new approaches to what it means to make the pedagogical more political as part of a global justice movement. Politics can no longer exclude matters of social and cultural learning and reproduction in the context of globalization or ignore the ways in which, as Imre Szeman asserts, globalization itself constitutes "a problem of and for pedagogy" (2002, 4). The slogan, "Another World is Possible!" reinforces the important political insight that one cannot act otherwise unless one can think otherwise, but acting otherwise demands a new politics in which it is recognized that global problems need global solutions along with global institutions, global modes of dissent, global intellectual collaboration, and global social movements. Sidebar Under the reign of neoliberalism with its growing commercialization of everyday life, the corporatization of higher education, the dismantling of the welfare state, the militarizing of public space, and the increasing privatization of the public sphere, it has become more difficult to address not only the complex nature of social agency and the importance of democratic public spheres, but also the fact that active and critical political agents have to be formed, educated, and socialized into the world of politics. Lacking a theoretical paradigm for linking learning to social change, existing political vocabularies appear increasingly powerless about how to theorize the crisis of political agency and political pessimism in the face of neoliberal assaults on all democratic public spheres. As the vast majority of citizens become detached from public forums that nourish social critique, political agency not only becomes a mockery of itself, it is replaced by market-based driven form of cultural politics in which private satisfactions replace social responsibilities and confessional culture become a substitute for systemic change. This paper argues that in the face of a virulent neoliberalism that spawns a vast educational propaganda machine, educators, cultural workers, and others need to rethink the entire project of politics within the changed conditions of a global political/pedagogical sphere. This article attempts to address the current crisis of meaning and political agency as a fundamental challenge to educators, public intellectuals, social movements, and others who believe in the promise of global democracy. In addressing this challenge, it argues that the urgency of the times demands a notion of global politics in which pedagogy, international alliances, and new forms of solidarity play a prominent role in the call for educators and others to be able to imagine otherwise in order to act otherwise.

#### Return of the Commonality---the starting point of blackness ontologically grounds identity which cannot create effective negativity---blackness is defined in opposition to whiteness which places white hegemony back at the forefront of our politics. This also fractures coalitions by beginning with difference instead of sameness.

Rectenwald 13 (Michael Rectenwald Ph.D Carnegie Mellon University- Literary and Cultural Studies, “From the Vampire Castle to Duck Dynasty: The Ideals of Identity Politics and How it Functions,” http://www.thenorthstar.info/?p=11671)

I have no objection to this point, which has been presented as antithetical to my take on identity politics. Ironically, in an article otherwise respectful of differences, Red Maistre ends up lumping me in a category of those who draw from the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to attack identity politics. While I am no stranger to the work of Nietzsche, the notion that my critique of the politics of identity might, by association I suppose, draw from the work of Nietzsche, is ludicrous. My criticism of identity politics has nothing to do with Nietzsche’s (or anyone else’s) problem with “ressentiment” or “slave morality.” Nor do I associate subaltern identity or even identity politics with either slave morality or ressentiment. If anything, my view might be said to be a critique of identity politics for falling short of the necessary negation, for not having strong enough politics of ressentiment or negation, and rather than breaking down oppression, serving instead to reify the categories against which oppression is levied. My argument more likely draws from and is analogous to that made by Marx in his argument with the Young Hegelians in The German Ideology. Rather than a battle against religion, Marx argued, we should be engaging in a battle against the conditions that make religions necessary. That is, rather than fighting against concepts that constrain or oppress the subject’s thinking, self-image, or identity, we should be fighting against the conditions that make such concepts or ideations possible or necessary. The capitalist system has enormous capacities for reconstitution and accommodation, one day favoring this, the next that identity, and also for serving up opponents mobilized against each other in a Hobbesian war.

However, contrary to what Red Maistre asserts in his piece, my argument is not against identities per se, which would be a ridiculous notion on its face. Under existing conditions, subaltern identities exist and to suggest that they simply go away is tantamount to blaming people for their own oppression. As Red Maistre points out it also suggests that subalterns as such cannot fully participate in social life. Of course, that this is the case is also part of the reason that identity politics exists in the first place.

But my argument is against a politics of identity en se, a politics of identity as an end of politics, rather than as a part of an ultimate politics to overcome capitalism. My critique of identity politics is not that identities themselves must be “liquidated” before class politics can proceed apace (although I do maintain that identity represents a one-sided aspect of human potentiality and that it, like the division of labor and the class itself, must eventually be negated and overcome). Rather, my argument is that, in the meanwhile, and as stopgaps in class politics, or out of despair for the class struggle against capitalism, identities can and have been used by a politics of identity to keep class politics from even registering on the horizon of political visibility. This is not the same as suggesting that identity is ultimately an insubstantial façade that must give way in the name of class. This is to say that identity politics, that which suggests that some necessary connection subsists between class, politics and identity, can and has been used as part of diversionary tactics away from an ultimate negation of commodity relations, the class, and subordinated categories of all kinds. Identity politics obscures a commonality within difference, and elevates identity difference to a political meaning that it does not deserve. To say this is not some simple “class reductionism.” It is to descry the relations and operations of identity in connection with class, not to boil down identity into class as such. Identity, it notes, is resistant to such class subsumption. If anything, it recognizes identity at a structural level, more so than does identity politics itself.

While easy, the case of Barack Obama should prove illustrative of the problems with identity politics, but not merely as a person of color who is also a member of the ruling class. Rather than mobilizing the class as a representative of an oppressed and super-exploited group within that class, as the Obama narrative suggested, Obama has served as a decoy of identity, a decoy that has been used precisely to divert change potentiality into a Democratic Party cul de sac and away from substantial politics. That is to say, identity and its rhetorics have been deployed as a substitute for a politics that grasps such identities as partss of a broader class oppression and exploitation. As in many other cases, in the case of Obama, identity politics has elevated identity to supremacy in political meaning, serving as a trompe-l’œil by suggesting that “race” has a necessary political meaning. But “race,” like other identities, has no necessary political meaning. It is thus a faulty gauge for the politics of identity group members.

More broadly speaking, in fact, as Jonathan Munis and I argued after the second election of Obama, in the United States,

the immediate producers have always been divided across the two-party system, and thus disunited and rendered virtually inert… The Obama coalition, as official media dubs it, has successfully maintained a vice-like grip on ethnic minority workers, as well as organized white workers. Meanwhile, the Republican Party continues to disorient unorganized white workers and rural populations more generally, on “cultural” and purported “privilege” grounds… Meanwhile, appeals in the opposite direction are made to professional and educated white liberals, who are flattered and ingratiated for their “progressive” identity politics by Obama and the Democrats, and are likewise encouraged to malign their natural class counterparts among the white working-class Republicans. This combination of self-flattery, ingratiation and denigration is precisely aimed at ruling out cross-party politics and results in the cultural and political isolation of white workers currently atomized and co-opted by rightist nostalgic [identity] politics. In short, together, the Democrats and Republicans have engineered a remarkable division of the working class along the lines of identity politics, which is a relative evil for precisely this reason. (emphasis added)

That identity and cultural politics have been mobilized as a means to alienate and antagonize, to produce rifts and to engage in vilification, is easily demonstrable. The case of Duck Dynasty is only the latest installment in a long, disgusting tired litany of identity and cultural politics, which is nothing if not a gift to the ruling class as it works to put its own construction on the working class. Liberal and “progressive” politics feeds right into such efforts, albeit unwittingly. Such identity and cultural politics function to produce class as an identity (and as an abject identity at that), rather than showing it for what it is, a positionality within the relations of production. That’s right; class is not, at base, an identity, because there are no particular characteristics that attend to persons in the working class, and members of various identity groups can likewise occupy the working-class positionality. The working class is not an identity group; it is the occupation of a position of necessary subordination to and service of capital in the reproduction of capital and the alienation of the class from both the means and the ends of production. This cannot be said unequivocally for identities, which may migrate beyond the class, and seek to form alliances that are antithetical to the class’s interests, and thus to the politics of ultimate emancipation. This identity politics includes, of course, the efforts of the right to identify white workers with class interests antithetical to their own.

This broader outline of the function of identity politics has been necessary for descrying how it functions within the “left,” whatever that may be. The wider function of identity politics must be understood before any miniature politics — a mere a tempest within a teapot I might add — can make the slightest bit of sense. The animus or supposed “vampirism” of identity politickers on the left, which is sometimes directed at Marxists who critique it, derives from this broader source: the persecution of subaltern identities by rightists who are trained by capital relations to produce themselves as such, and are trained to produce the denigrated groups as such, as well. Similarly, the leftists are trained to produce themselves as such, and to produce their denigrated opponents as such, as well. To say that these parallel forms of identity production and denigration mirror the master slave dialectic is to state the obvious; nevertheless it is notable that the categories are mutually constitutive. And it should be clear that their negation as such, as denigrated categories that is, could never be accomplished on the basis of identity alone.

### AT: Foot Noting

#### Identity critique has a built in half life; it’s impossible to privilege every identity group which requires prioritization of oppression or an infinitely regressive process of watching over watchers. The perpetual assessment machinizes identity without improving knowledge production or our relationships to alterity

Davis 1 (Lennard, is an internationally known specialist in disability studies, Distinguished Professor of English at the University of Illinois, “Identity Politics, Disability, and Culture,” Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage Publications. http://isc.temple.edu/neighbor/ds/read/identitypolitics.pdf)

The lack of attention paid to disability by those in the forefront of identity and multicultural studies dramatically shows that the Occam's razor, used to evaluate critical works ("Docs it focus on race, gender, or sexual orientation?") is a dull razor indeed. Rather, one can say that identity politics, as a method of literary analysis, will necessarily reflect the biases of its own time. While our consciousness of some selected and canonized identities has certainly been raised, the biases of those within the confines of the canon remain confirmed by their invisibility. Identity studies is no more perfect, value free, and objective than hermeneutics, structuralism, or any other applied discourse. Perhaps people of the future will be astounded, puzzled, and disturbed that works by scholars such as Eve Sedgewick, Judith Butler, Henry Louis Gates, bell hooks, and others managed to steer so completely away from any discussion of disability. I should make clear that my solution to the problem of identity is not inclusion of disability to the roster of favored identities. Rather, the point is that identity studies itself is limited in our time by the necessarily taxonomic peculiarity of its endeavor. Inclusiveness will not solve the problem. The list of identities will only grow larger, tied to an ever-expanding idea of inclusiveness. After all, when all identities are finally included in the roster, how can there be this particular kind of identity? If alterity is subsumed under the rubric of identity, then what can identity mean, particularly if this kind of cultural identity is somehow actually based on a binary opposition between self and other? Identity becomes so broad a category that it cannot contain identity. In other words, identity politics, while useful during the latter part of the twentieth century in securing civil rights for some disenfranchised groups, has by the twenty-first century reached a paradoxical resolution to a problem that started as a logical extension of a discussion about rights. It is Wendy Brown's (1995) point citing Foucault, that "the universal juridical ideal of liberalism," combined with "the normalizing principle of disciplinary regimes and taken up within the discourse of politicized identity," yields a new kind of subject "reiterative of regulatory, disciplinary society," which "ceaselessly characterizes, classifies, and specializes," working through "surveillance, continuous registration, perpetual assessment, and classification" and through a social machinery "that is both immense and minute" (p. 65). In other words, the classificatory and judgmental system inherent in an identity critique of novels will necessarily end up surveilling texts through an ever-expanding and therefore increasingly imprecise grid. This framework will therefore yield less and less information about more and more works and will become a system that explains everything, thus ultimately explaining nothing. For example, if the function of identity criticism has been to point out the sexism, racism, ableism, homophobia, and so on in canonical texts, then this policing action will eventually turn in on itself. In this case, the ever-increasing trolling for missed identities or stereotypical characters will have to, by its own logic, begin to critique itself. Critics will then point to other critics who have failed to notice incidents of particular "isms." And so on. Likewise, identity critics can point favorably at other texts that exhibit positive images of oppressed identities. Finally, there is also the possibility of locating "resistant" texts that appeared in more oppressive periods but that managed to tactically and strategically pass muster of the dominant culture while offering transgressive and elusive readings that allowed certain collusive readers to find resistance to that dominant paradigm. That seems to be the extent of identity critique, and this kind of work seems to have a built-in half-life. How long can any particular critic perform this particular activity? What will be perpetually needed are new identities on the block to keep the process going, although methodologically not much new will be happening in that street game. To complicate this already complicated critique further, I want to point to the inability of identity politics to include disability under its tent in some way other than with second-class status. My point is to question the following: How effective is an antidiscriminatory stance, based on identity politics, when the watchman always needs to be watched? Another way of putting this point is that no coalition of identity-based activists or scholars will ever be able to avoid marginalizing and minoritizing some group. Bosnian mothers. East Timorese Christians, or Ethiopian Jews

will always be out of favor and, if not them, then tribal peoples of northern India or indigenous rebels in Sri Lanka. The point is that an inherent limitation of permitted or favored identities is precisely built into the definition of the project. Furthermore, the contradiction becomes more acute when we realize that much of identity politics in the United States is a reaction to a rights-based model rather than an economically egalitarian, political one, as it is in the United Kingdom. In the former case, then, the necessity for identity is actually a compromise formation in theory tailored to a largely middle-class—precisely. First World— audience seeking reassurance about the parameters of liberal thought and politics. Likewise, the interest in identity in novel criticism is a ratification of this reassurance. If one can say, for example, that women are depicted in a binary way in novels to be either the madwoman or the angel, an alternative to either of these roles is held out as a norm. What is that alternative but some superscription of the ideal of white middle-class men with full rights? Likewise, the benchmark for people of color is the depiction of the middle class or gentry as full-fledged members of society. As Brown (1995) writes, "Without recourse to the white masculine middle- class idea, politicized identities would forfeit a good deal of their claims to injury and exclusion, their claims to the political significance of their difference" (p. 61).

## 1nr

## Framework

### 1NR A2: No Topical Affs

#### The premise of their response that their identity should be protected from exposure to reason-giving debate--- impedes the culture of democratic debate that’s key to effective decisionmaking in a pluralistic society---it’s also simply wrong to claim that framework oppresses identity or alternate styles---our argument is style-neutral---it simply asks that their liberatory mechanisms use a policy conclusion which solves their offense as well as ours

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions, even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society.

One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.)

The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument.

Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference.

More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

### 1NR A2: State Rationalizes Itself

#### Historical oppression and identity is valuable to discussion, but an identity to the point where it inhibits intersubjective dialogue about the resolution amounts to cultural reductionism that makes communal democratic politics impossible and flips the aff

Amanda Anderson 6, prof of English at Johns Hopkins The Way We Argue Now, 2-5

At the same time, however, the book engages in an internal critique of certain tendencies within the field of theory. These essays repeatedly draw attention to the underdeveloped and often incoherent evaluative stance of contemporary theory, its inability to clearly avow the norms and values underlying its own critical programs. In particular, I contest the prevalent skepticism about the possibility or desirability of achieving reflective distance on one's social or cultural positioning. As a result of poststructuralism's insistence on the forms of finitude--linguistic, psychological, and cultural--that limit individual agency, and multiculturalism's insistence on the primacy of ascribed group identity and its accompanying perspectives, the concept of critical distance has been seriously discredited, even as it necessarily informs many of the very accounts that announce its ¶ 2¶ bankruptcy. The alliance between the poststructuralist critique of reason and the form of sociological reductionism that governs the politics of identity threatens to undermine the vitality of both academic and political debate insofar as it becomes impossible to explore shared forms of rationality. Given these conditions, in fact, this book might well have been called "The Way We Fail to Argue Now."2¶ To counter the tendencies of both poststructuralism and identity politics, I advance a renewed assessment of the work of philosopher Jürgen Habermas, whose interrelated theories of communicative action, discourse ethics, and democratic proceduralism have provoked continued and often dismissive critique from theorists in the fields of literary studies, cultural studies, and political theory. The book is in no way an uncritical embrace of Habermas's theory, however. Rather, it offers a renewed assessment of the notions of critical distance and procedural democracy in light of the arguments that have been waged against them. In part I do this by giving airtime to those debates in which Habermas and like-minded critics have engaged poststructuralism. But I also try to give Habermas a new hearing by showing the ways in which his theories promote an understanding of reflective distance as an achieved and lived practice, one with an intimate bearing on questions of ethos and character. Typically dismissed as impersonal, abstract, and arid, rational discourse of the kind associated with the neo-Kantianism of Habermas and his followers is often employed as a contrast to valorized ideals of embodied identities, feelings and passions, ethics and politics--in short, all the values that are seen to imbue theoretical practice with existential meaningfulness and moral force. This very opposition, which has effectively structured many influential academic debates, involves a serious misreading and reduction of the rationalist tradition, which at its most compelling seeks precisely to understand communicative reason and the aspiration to critical distance as an embedded practice, as an ongoing achievement rather than a fantasmatic imposition. This aspiration, moreover, also characterizes collective forms of liberal politics, including the practices and procedures that constitute the democratic tradition and are so vital to its ongoing health and stability.¶ More generally, and throughout the book, I draw out the practical ¶ 3¶ imagination of theories in order to contest the assumption that theory is overly abstract, irrelevant, or elitist and to draw attention to an all but ubiquitous pull, even in theories from very different and even antagonistic traditions, toward questions of embodiment and enactment--questions of practice, that is. With varying degrees of explicitness and self-awareness, I argue, contemporary theories present themselves as ways of living, as practical philosophies with both individualist and collective aspirations. Indeed, many recent theoretical projects join in a desire to correct for, or answer to, the overly abstract elements of earlier forms of theory. This movement manifests itself in various and not entirely commensurate ways; within literary studies, to take a central example, it appears in a keen attention to the social position of writers, readers, and characters, an increasing focus on the sensibility or location of the critic or theorist, and a concern with the ethics of reading and criticism more broadly. It is my contention that these developments reflect a persistent existential movement toward thicker characterological conceptions of theoretical postures and stances, though it is rarely put in these terms. Indeed, the interest in characterological enactment often operates below the radar, or with only half-lit awareness. One symptom of the underdeveloped yet nonetheless insistent nature of this aspect of contemporary theory is the fact that the term "ethos," which reflects a general interest in the ethical texture of theory's project, appears regularly across recent work in literature and political theory.3¶ I am interested in exploring this turn toward the existential dimensions of theory, claiming it as a kind of dialectical advance, and using it to reconsider our understanding of those forms of political theory--rationalism and proceduralism--that have been framed as most ethos-deficient. But the story is somewhat more complicated and internally contested than this brief summary might lead one to expect. These complexities have largely to do with a point I raised at the outset: namely, that highly constrained sociological forms have governed the analysis of subjectivity and personal experience in literary and cultural studies after poststructuralism. In the late 1980s, an interest in first-person perspectives and in the lived experiences of diverse social groups emerged among critics who felt that the high altitudes at which theory operated failed to capture the density and meaningfulness of individual and collective life. There were a series of famous "confessional writings" by critics, which ¶ 4¶ often opposed themselves to theoretical approaches.4 Within theory itself, there was also an increasing attention to subjective effects and enactment, and a subsequent tendency to focus the lens on the middle distance and the close up, to relinquish the panoramas and the aerial views. Thus, not only did a new subjectivism emerge in opposition to theory, it also began to affect theory itself as an internal pressure. The most telling example here would be the dramatic late turn in the work of Michel Foucault, which set aside the far-reaching examinination of modern power and modern institutions to explore the "care of the self" within antiquity and, to a lesser degree, within modernity, as well. While Foucault's previous work had been interested in the forms of subjectivity engendered by modern disciplinary power, the later Foucault was interested in the manner in which individuals understood, conducted, and therefore in some sense owned, their moral, social, and physical lives.5¶ What should be noted about much of this work on the individual subject, however, is that it gave preeminence to sociological or group identity--varionsly defined by the categories of class, race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, and sexuality. One of the recurrent themes of this book is that a narrow understanding of selfhood and practice results from an overemphasis on sociological, ascribed, or group identity. Intellectual practices over the past several decades have been profoundly enriched and advanced through analysis of the ways that identity categories shape bodies of knowledge, cultural life, and relations of power. But it is also the case that contemporary forms of sociological and cultural reductionism limit how critics and theorists imagine the relation between intellectual and ethicopolitical life.6 The conviction that identity is fundamentally ¶ 5¶ status-based, pregiven in some fundamental way by the groups or categories that make up the sociological map, constrains the resources of practical and ethical discourses in key ways.7 This discursive poverty is evidenced by the two ethicopolitical options that often seem to be on offer: on the one hand, there is a strong theoretical tradition, deriving from poststructuralism and queer theory, that advocates the subversion of identity by any means possible--the denaturalization of what are nonetheless inescapably imposed identities by means of parody, irony, or resignification.8 On the other hand, by those more interested in the virtues of mosaic diversity and more convinced of the importance of socialized belonging, there is a quasi-communitarian commitment to the notion that forms of cultural affiliation must be acknowledged, defended, or cushioned, particularly from what is seen as the evacuating force of liberal or rational agendas.9¶ The "politics of identity" (to suggest something less reified and discredited than "identity politics") is a theoretically and practically significant dimension of contemporary historical and sociological life. It is not my aim or desire to somehow argue it out of existence (as though that were possible). But limitations ensue when the politics of identity is imagined to cover all available intellectual and ethicopolitical space. The privileging of only those forms of critique that are associated with the postmodern modes of irony and negative freedom, moreover, results in a widespread and deleterious rejection of the resources of the Kantian and liberal traditions. I question the assumptions fueling this recurrent bias and advance a defense of critical reason, discourse ethics, and those political forms and institutions that seek reflectively to realize liberal and democratic principles.¶ From a somewhat different but equally important angle, I explore how contemporary theory is already pursuing a less constrained understanding

### 1NR A2: Delegitimize their scholarship

#### We don’t rig the game against them by allowing a stable point of clash

**Tally, Texas State University, 2007**

(Robert, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2, project muse)

Mouffe's image of a we/they politics in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony looks a bit like organized sports. Consider the football game: rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle for dominance, with a clear winner and loser, yet agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself (i.e., the political association) in order to achieve the side's particular goals. Football teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus, but victory. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured. If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. Responding to the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association), Mouffe answers that it requires distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52) Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all. A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair ("you get a head start"), more safe ("no hitting"), more interesting ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, but the specifics of how the game is played can vary. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But this model at least provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide? These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

#### Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff

Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)

25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.

### 1NR A2: Dialogue

#### resolutional criticism is the role of the neg-monopolizing that prevents meaningful relationship and creates de facto monologue

**Galloway, Samford communications professor, 2007**

(Ryan, “Dinner and Conversation at the Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate as an Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, 28, ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.